Quokkapix MCP Server
quokkapix-mcp
npm
v0.4.3
Published by quokkapix — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local MCP adapter for QuokkaPix browser-only image workflows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/bridge-client.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/bridge-client.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createBridgeExecutor } from "./bridge-executor.mjs"; import { MCP_ADAP
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/bridge-client.mjs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_payment_options]) co-exist with external-action tools ([validate_result_manifest]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_payment_options] → sinks [validate_result_manifest]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_payment_options → validate_result_manifest
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_payment_optionsingests untrusted inputvalidate_result_manifestnetwork egressexplain_payment_flowno sensitive capabilityget_recipeno sensitive capabilityget_rule_profileno sensitive capabilitylist_recipesno sensitive capabilitylist_rule_profilesno sensitive capabilityprocess_imagesno sensitive capabilityprocess_with_settingsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_recipeno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
verify_unlock_tokenno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.3.6 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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