QuintaDB MCP Server
https://quintadb.com/mcp
Remote
v1.0.0
Published by quintadb.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
No-code databases, forms, portals and AI sites. Manage records and automation via natural language.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 21.7 = 78. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Mixed-script (homoglyph) text in inputSchema.properties.csv_text.description MTC-UNI-009 | injection |
| −6.3 | Annotation contradicts behavior on "create_field" MTC-CAP-003 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 78 − 6 = 72. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Mixed-script (homoglyph) text in inputSchema.properties.csv_text.descriptionMTC-UNI-009
A single token mixes multiple scripts (Latin, Cyrillic). This is the signature of a homoglyph attack — visually identical characters from another script used to impersonate a trusted name or slip past keyword filters.
Evidence: CSV-текст з заголовками в першому рядку. Підтримує коми і крапку з комою як роздільник. Приклад: "Ім'я,Email,Статус\nІва
Fix: Restrict metadata to a single script, or normalize confusables before display.
Location: tool import_records · inputSchema.properties.csv_text.description
high Tool "create_field" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_field" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_field
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([web_search, fetch_url]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file_to_record, run_action, create_email_template, create_sms_template, create_action_rule, create_field, create_webhook, delete_webhook, update_form_settings, delete_template]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [web_search, fetch_url] → sinks [upload_file_to_record, run_action, create_email_template, create_sms_template, create_action_rule, create_field, crea
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow web_search → upload_file_to_record
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_action_rule"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_action_rule" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_action_rule · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fetch_url"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "fetch_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool fetch_url · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "create_field"MTC-CAP-003
Tool "create_field" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.
Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.
Location: tool create_field
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_body" on "create_field"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_field" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_body" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_field · inputSchema.properties.script_body
Tools 116
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
create_action_rulenetwork egresscreate_email_templatenetwork egresscreate_fieldruns code / shellcreate_sms_templatenetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_templatenetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressfetch_urlingests untrusted inputrun_actionnetwork egressupdate_form_settingsnetwork egress
Show 106 more tools ↓
upload_file_to_recordnetwork egressweb_searchingests untrusted inputadd_dashboard_itemno sensitive capabilityadd_portal_menu_itemno sensitive capabilityadd_record_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_user_to_portal_groupno sensitive capabilityadd_user_to_team_groupno sensitive capabilityattach_media_to_recordno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_recordsno sensitive capabilitycheck_ai_site_statusno sensitive capabilityconfigure_chatno sensitive capabilitycreate_calendarno sensitive capabilitycreate_chartno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_formno sensitive capabilitycreate_formattingno sensitive capabilitycreate_mapno sensitive capabilitycreate_portalno sensitive capabilitycreate_portal_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_recordno sensitive capabilitycreate_record_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminderno sensitive capabilitycreate_reportno sensitive capabilitycreate_saved_viewno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_team_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_telegram_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_whatsapp_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_few_recordsno sensitive capabilitydelete_fieldno sensitive capabilitydelete_formno sensitive capabilitydelete_portal_groupno sensitive capabilitydelete_portal_menu_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_portal_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_recordno sensitive capabilitydelete_records_by_filterno sensitive capabilitydelete_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_saved_viewno sensitive capabilitydelete_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_team_groupno sensitive capabilitydescribe_projectno sensitive capabilityduplicate_formno sensitive capabilityduplicate_recordno sensitive capabilityexport_recordsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_projectno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_siteno sensitive capabilityget_column_totalno sensitive capabilityget_field_typesno sensitive capabilityget_form_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_form_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_metricno sensitive capabilityget_portal_pageno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_quickstart_guideno sensitive capabilityget_recordno sensitive capabilityget_recordsno sensitive capabilityget_rel_idno sensitive capabilityget_report_datano sensitive capabilityget_reportsno sensitive capabilityget_usage_statsno sensitive capabilityget_user_infono sensitive capabilityimport_recordsno sensitive capabilityinvite_portal_userno sensitive capabilitylist_action_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_chartsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_formsno sensitive capabilitylist_mapsno sensitive capabilitylist_portal_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_portal_menu_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_portal_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_portal_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_portalsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_record_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_saved_viewsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_team_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_user_rolesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityplace_media_on_siteno sensitive capabilityremove_user_from_portal_groupno sensitive capabilityremove_user_from_team_groupno sensitive capabilityreorder_fieldsno sensitive capabilitysearch_imageno sensitive capabilitysearch_recordsno sensitive capabilityseed_recordsno sensitive capabilityset_column_sizeno sensitive capabilityset_module_permissionno sensitive capabilityset_table_permissionno sensitive capabilityset_user_roleno sensitive capabilityupdate_action_ruleno sensitive capabilityupdate_cellno sensitive capabilityupdate_fieldno sensitive capabilityupdate_formno sensitive capabilityupdate_portal_menu_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_portal_pageno sensitive capabilityupdate_portal_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_recordno sensitive capabilityupdate_record_templateno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
C 72/100 | 8 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-24 |
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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