Qinglong (weiyvshan) MCP Server
qinglong-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.14
Source verified
Published by weiyvshan — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| ✓ | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 26
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "qinglong_run_script"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "qinglong_run_script" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow qinglong_run_script
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([qinglong_list_scripts, qinglong_get_log_detail, qinglong_get_script, qinglong_create_script, qinglong_update_script, qinglong_delete_script, qinglong_run_script, qinglong_stop_script]) and tools that can send data out ([qinglong_create_cron, qinglong_update_cron, qinglong_run_script, qinglong_send_notification]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [qinglong_list_scripts, qinglong_get_log_detail, qinglong_get_script, qinglong_create_script, qinglong_update_script, qinglong_delete_script, qinglong_r
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow qinglong_list_scripts → qinglong_create_cron
high Tool "qinglong_create_cron" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "qinglong_create_cron" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool qinglong_create_cron
high Tool "qinglong_update_cron" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "qinglong_update_cron" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool qinglong_update_cron
high Tool "qinglong_run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "qinglong_run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool qinglong_run_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "qinglong_create_cron"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "qinglong_create_cron" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool qinglong_create_cron · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "qinglong_update_cron"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "qinglong_update_cron" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool qinglong_update_cron · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "qinglong_create_cron" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "qinglong_create_cron" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool qinglong_create_cron
low Mutating tool "qinglong_update_cron" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "qinglong_update_cron" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool qinglong_update_cron
low Mutating tool "qinglong_run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "qinglong_run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool qinglong_run_script
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_list_scripts"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_list_scripts" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_list_scripts · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_get_log_detail"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_get_log_detail" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_get_log_detail · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file" on "qinglong_get_log_detail"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_get_log_detail" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_get_log_detail · inputSchema.properties.file
low Unconstrained path parameter "file" on "qinglong_get_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_get_script" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_get_script · inputSchema.properties.file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_get_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_get_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_get_script · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "qinglong_create_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_create_script" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_create_script · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_create_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_create_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_create_script · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "qinglong_create_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_create_script" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_create_script · inputSchema.properties.directory
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "qinglong_update_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_update_script" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_update_script · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_update_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_update_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_update_script · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "qinglong_delete_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_delete_script" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_delete_script · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_delete_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_delete_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_delete_script · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "qinglong_run_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_run_script" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_run_script · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_run_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_run_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_run_script · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "qinglong_stop_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_stop_script" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_stop_script · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "qinglong_stop_script"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "qinglong_stop_script" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool qinglong_stop_script · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
qinglong_run_scriptruns code / shellreads sensitive dataqinglong_create_cronruns code / shellqinglong_create_scriptreads sensitive dataqinglong_delete_scriptreads sensitive dataqinglong_get_log_detailreads sensitive dataqinglong_get_scriptreads sensitive dataqinglong_list_scriptsreads sensitive dataqinglong_send_notificationnetwork egressqinglong_stop_scriptreads sensitive dataqinglong_update_cronruns code / shellqinglong_update_scriptreads sensitive dataqinglong_create_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityqinglong_create_envsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_create_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityqinglong_delete_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_delete_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityqinglong_delete_envsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_delete_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_disable_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_disable_envsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_disable_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_enable_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_enable_envsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_enable_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_get_cron_logno sensitive capabilityqinglong_get_cron_logsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_get_system_infono sensitive capabilityqinglong_list_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_list_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityqinglong_list_envsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_list_logsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_list_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_reinstall_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityqinglong_run_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_run_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_stop_cronsno sensitive capabilityqinglong_update_envno sensitive capabilityqinglong_update_subscriptionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.14 latest |
A 94/100 | 26 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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