Qianexchange MCP Server
@qianexchange/mcp
npm
v0.4.0
Published by @qianexchange — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Qian (qian.ag): trade tokens and stocks, launch tokens, run QianPay payment links and invoices on Base and Arc, and pay x402 APIs in USDC from any MCP-capable agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: x402_pay → get_token → pay_dashboard. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow x402_pay → get_token → pay_dashboard
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "x402_pay"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "x402_pay" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool x402_pay · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "set_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "set_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool set_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_tokenreads sensitive datapay_dashboardnetwork egressrotate_webhook_secretnetwork egressset_webhooknetwork egressx402_payingests untrusted inputbuyno sensitive capabilitybuy_stockno sensitive capabilitycancel_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitycharge_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitycollect_feesno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
create_api_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_payment_linkno sensitive capabilitycreate_subscription_offerno sensitive capabilityget_holdersno sensitive capabilityget_payment_linkno sensitive capabilityget_subscription_offerno sensitive capabilityget_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityget_tradesno sensitive capabilitylaunch_tokenno sensitive capabilitylist_stocksno sensitive capabilitylist_tokensno sensitive capabilitymy_positionsno sensitive capabilitymy_walletno sensitive capabilitypay_linkno sensitive capabilitypending_feesno sensitive capabilityquote_buyno sensitive capabilityquote_sellno sensitive capabilityquote_stockno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilitysellno sensitive capabilitysell_stockno sensitive capabilityset_pay_profileno sensitive capabilitysubscribeno sensitive capabilityx402_walletno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @qianexchange/mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
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