Pyrokine Ssh MCP Server
@pyrokine/mcp-ssh
npm
v2.4.1
Published by @pyrokine — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A comprehensive SSH MCP Server for Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata MTC-INJ-TARGET-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 11 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_download → ssh_read_file → ssh_exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow ssh_download → ssh_read_file → ssh_exec
high Tool "ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec
high Tool "ssh_exec_as_user" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec_as_user" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec_as_user
high Tool "ssh_exec_sudo" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec_sudo" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec_sudo
high Tool "ssh_exec_batch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec_batch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec_batch
high Tool "ssh_quick_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_quick_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_quick_exec
high Tool "ssh_exec_parallel" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec_parallel" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec_parallel
high Tool "ssh_exec_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_exec_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_exec_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/file-ops.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/file-ops.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'crypto'; import * as fs from 'fs'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/file-ops.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/session-manager.js:280`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 执行命令 */ async exec(alias, command, options = {}) { const session = this.getSession(alias); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/session-manager.js
medium Tool "ssh_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ssh_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec_as_user" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec_as_user" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec_as_user
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec_sudo" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec_sudo" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec_sudo
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec_batch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec_batch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec_batch
low Mutating tool "ssh_quick_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_quick_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_quick_exec
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec_parallel" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec_parallel" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec_parallel
low Mutating tool "ssh_exec_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_exec_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_exec_script
low Mutating tool "ssh_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "ssh_config_list". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool ssh_config_list · description
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ssh_downloadingests untrusted inputssh_execruns code / shellssh_exec_as_userruns code / shellssh_exec_batchruns code / shellssh_exec_parallelruns code / shellssh_exec_scriptruns code / shellssh_exec_sudoruns code / shellssh_quick_execruns code / shellssh_read_filereads sensitive datassh_write_filewrites files
Show 25 more tools ↓
ssh_config_listno sensitive capabilityssh_connectno sensitive capabilityssh_disconnectno sensitive capabilityssh_file_infono sensitive capabilityssh_forward_closeno sensitive capabilityssh_forward_listno sensitive capabilityssh_forward_localno sensitive capabilityssh_forward_remoteno sensitive capabilityssh_list_dirno sensitive capabilityssh_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilityssh_mkdirno sensitive capabilityssh_operation_cancelno sensitive capabilityssh_operation_listno sensitive capabilityssh_operation_readno sensitive capabilityssh_operation_startno sensitive capabilityssh_operation_statusno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_closeno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_listno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_readno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_resizeno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_startno sensitive capabilityssh_pty_writeno sensitive capabilityssh_reconnectno sensitive capabilityssh_syncno sensitive capabilityssh_uploadno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
B 88/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @pyrokine/mcp-ssh --onlineOther implementations of Pyrokine Ssh 26
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 27 side by side →
MCP server enabling AI assistants to securely execute SSH commands, transfer files via SFTP, manage port forwarding, and use parameterized command templates with comprehensive security controls
SSH Server for Model Context Protocol
SSH MCP - tools for remote SSH operations for debugging
MCP server for SSH remote command execution
MCP server exposing SSH control for Linux and Windows systems via Model Context Protocol.
SSH MCP Server - Universal tool for managing remote servers via AI assistants (Cursor, Claude Desktop). Supports command execution, file operations, log management and system health check.
More in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.