Pyfastmail MCP Server

pyfastmail-mcp PyPI v0.3.2

Published by pjosols — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Fastmail — email, contacts, calendar, and files via JMAP, CardDAV, CalDAV, and WebDAV

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: contacts_get_contact → files_list → mail_forward_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow contacts_get_contact → files_list → mail_forward_email

Tools 48

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • contacts_get_contactingests untrusted input
  • files_getingests untrusted input
  • files_listreads sensitive data
  • mail_download_attachmentingests untrusted input
  • mail_export_emailingests untrusted input
  • mail_forward_emailnetwork egress
  • mail_parse_emailingests untrusted input
  • mail_send_emailnetwork egress
  • calendar_create_eventno sensitive capability
  • calendar_delete_eventno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
  • calendar_get_eventno sensitive capability
  • calendar_list_calendarsno sensitive capability
  • calendar_list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • calendar_update_eventno sensitive capability
  • contacts_create_contactno sensitive capability
  • contacts_delete_contactno sensitive capability
  • contacts_listno sensitive capability
  • contacts_list_address_booksno sensitive capability
  • contacts_query_contactsno sensitive capability
  • contacts_update_contactno sensitive capability
  • files_create_folderno sensitive capability
  • files_deleteno sensitive capability
  • files_moveno sensitive capability
  • files_uploadno sensitive capability
  • health_checkno sensitive capability
  • mail_archive_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_create_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • mail_create_masked_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_delete_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_delete_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • mail_get_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_get_email_threadno sensitive capability
  • mail_get_recent_emailsno sensitive capability
  • mail_import_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_list_identitiesno sensitive capability
  • mail_list_mailboxesno sensitive capability
  • mail_list_masked_emailsno sensitive capability
  • mail_manage_email_labelsno sensitive capability
  • mail_mark_email_readno sensitive capability
  • mail_move_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_pin_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_rename_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • mail_reply_to_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_search_emailsno sensitive capability
  • mail_search_snippetsno sensitive capability
  • mail_set_identityno sensitive capability
  • mail_update_masked_emailno sensitive capability
  • mail_upload_attachmentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.3.2 latest A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan pyfastmail-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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