Pycex — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "pycex",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "pycex"
},
"server": {
"name": "pycex"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 99,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cex/bnc/public_cm.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cex/bnc/public_cm.py:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cex/bnc/public_cm.py"
},
"evidence": "ATA ) from cex.bnc.rest import ( request ) from cex.bnc.enums import ( ContractType, KlineInterval, ) from c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "cex/bnc/public_cm.py",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cex/bnc/public_spot.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cex/bnc/public_spot.py:9`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cex/bnc/public_spot.py"
},
"evidence": "ype ) from cex.cex_name import ( CexName ) from cex.bnc.endpoints import ( API_ENDPOINT, API_V3 ) from cex.b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "cex/bnc/public_spot.py",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (cex/bnc/public_um.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cex/bnc/public_um.py:9`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cex/bnc/public_um.py"
},
"evidence": "ype ) from cex.cex_name import ( CexName ) from cex.bnc.rest import ( request ) from cex.bnc.endpoints import (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "cex/bnc/public_um.py",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"pycex\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "pycex"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "2a9669d3c7d3c4667f0c21f3af7396cefd313ed2b4b0df1128955209d09a1724",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}