Pycentauri MCP Server
pycentauri
PyPI
v0.9.0
Published by bjan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files, delete_files]) and tools that can send data out ([upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files, delete_files] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → upload_file
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pycentauri/rtsp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pycentauri/rtsp.py:184`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: stop)") proc = subprocess.Popen( [mediamtx_bin, cfg_path], stdout=None, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pycentauri/rtsp.py
medium Tool "delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_files
low Mutating tool "delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_files
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filesreads sensitive datawrites fileslist_filesreads sensitive dataupload_filenetwork egressdiscover_printersno sensitive capabilitydisk_infono sensitive capabilityget_attributesno sensitive capabilityget_canvas_statusno sensitive capabilityget_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitypause_printno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
print_historyno sensitive capabilityresume_printno sensitive capabilityset_auto_refillno sensitive capabilityset_fan_speedno sensitive capabilityset_lightno sensitive capabilityset_print_speedno sensitive capabilityset_temperaturesno sensitive capabilitystart_printno sensitive capabilitystop_printno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan pycentauri --online --registry pypiMore in Data Science & ML
Security scan results for the 2sio MCP server.
ArXiv preprints + Google Scholar papers, with citation counts in one query.
Security scan results for the Add MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ai Archive MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aira Semanticscholar MCP server.
Korean premium short-term rental search: natural language or structured filters (SHV engine).