Pyapple MCP Server
pyapple-mcp
PyPI
v1.6.1
Published by 54yyyu — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Python implementation of Apple MCP tools for macOS
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2589`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: p/holiday.jpg -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` is judged as `~/.ssh/id_rsa` and refused. Judging the string the caller passed i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pyapple_mcp/setup_helper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/setup_helper.py:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ocess result = subprocess.run( [ "find", os.path.expanduser("~"),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/setup_helper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pyapple_mcp/utils/applescript.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/utils/applescript.py:145`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t process = subprocess.run( ["osascript", "-e", script], capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/utils/applescript.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pyapple_mcp/utils/maps.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/utils/maps.py:244`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pyapple_mcp.utils.maps"], input=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/utils/maps.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2283`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: to. completed = subprocess.run( [opener, f"imessage://{target}"], capture_output=True, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pyapple_mcp/utils/shortcuts.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pyapple_mcp/utils/shortcuts.py:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: done = subprocess.run( [self.binary, *args], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pyapple_mcp/utils/shortcuts.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_messages_attachments.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_messages_attachments.py:762`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t mail* to text `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to a number in the body, and every step of that is an operation this package offers.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_messages_attachments.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_applescript_escaping.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_applescript_escaping.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: urn value' result = subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=True) assert result.re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_applescript_escaping.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:1908`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nvironment): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pyapple_mcp.cli", *argv], cwd=str(REPO_R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_doctor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_doctor.py:868`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: son. """ done = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, "-c", "import sys;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_doctor.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_policy.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_policy.py:595`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ules))" ) out = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", probe], cwd=str(REPO), capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_policy.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_server.py:685`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import Path done = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", "import pyapple_mcp.server"], cwd=str(Pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_server.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.5.1 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v1.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v1.0.2 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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