Pvliesdonk Scholar MCP Server
pvliesdonk-scholar-mcp
PyPI
v1.9.1
Published by pvliesdonk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
FastMCP server for Semantic Scholar with OpenAlex enrichment and docling PDF conversion
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/stamp_manifests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/stamp_manifests.py:236`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ths: return subprocess.run( ["git", "add", "-f", "--", *[str(p) for p in paths]], check=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/stamp_manifests.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_commit_conventions.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_commit_conventions.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(CHECKER), *args], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_commit_conventions.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_import_surface.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_import_surface.py:77`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: oot. """ proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-P", "-c", _ENUMERATE], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_import_surface.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_release_flow_contract.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_release_flow_contract.py:1024`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: orkdir``.""" return subprocess.run( ["bash", str(GUARD)], cwd=workdir, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_release_flow_contract.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_structural_gate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_structural_gate.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l selection. return subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, "-m", "ruff",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_structural_gate.py
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_and_convertingests untrusted inputfetch_paper_pdfingests untrusted inputfetch_patent_pdfingests untrusted inputfetch_pdf_by_urlingests untrusted inputbatch_resolveno sensitive capabilityconvert_pdf_to_markdownno sensitive capabilityenrich_paperno sensitive capabilityfind_bridge_papersno sensitive capabilitygenerate_citationsno sensitive capabilityget_authorno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_bookno sensitive capabilityget_book_excerptno sensitive capabilityget_citation_graphno sensitive capabilityget_citationsno sensitive capabilityget_citing_patentsno sensitive capabilityget_paperno sensitive capabilityget_patentno sensitive capabilityget_referencesno sensitive capabilityget_standardno sensitive capabilityget_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityget_task_resultno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilityrecommend_booksno sensitive capabilityrecommend_papersno sensitive capabilityresolve_standard_identifierno sensitive capabilitysearch_booksno sensitive capabilitysearch_papersno sensitive capabilitysearch_patentsno sensitive capabilitysearch_standardsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.9.0 |
A 96/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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