Pursr MCP Server

pursr npm v0.10.2

Published by 0xheycat — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

pursr — Visual QA, audit, and MCP for the browser. One CLI + one MCP server for screenshots, sweeps, baselines, diffs, axe-core a11y audits, HAR capture, and auth state — with parallel sweep workers, auto-healing selectors, and a plugin system. Zero brows

View on npm ↗ Repository ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

99/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 99/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Minimal

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 99/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/runway.js)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`src/runway.js:28`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: _chromium = (await import(url)).chromium; return { chromium: _chromium, source: "codex-cua-node" };

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/runway.js

Tools 18

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

pursr_actno sensitive capability
pursr_auditno sensitive capability
pursr_checkno sensitive capability
pursr_diagnosticsno sensitive capability
pursr_diffno sensitive capability
pursr_dom_snapshotno sensitive capability
pursr_framesno sensitive capability
pursr_inspectno sensitive capability
pursr_probeno sensitive capability
pursr_screenshotno sensitive capability

Show 8 more tools ↓

pursr_session_closeno sensitive capability
pursr_session_openno sensitive capability
pursr_sessionsno sensitive capability
pursr_shootno sensitive capability
pursr_snapshotno sensitive capability
pursr_sweepno sensitive capability
shoot: no sensitive capability
sweep: no sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v0.10.2` latest	A 99/100	1	1.13.0	2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pursr/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pursr)

HTML

<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pursr"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/pursr/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>

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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.