Prts MCP Server
prts-mcp
PyPI
v2.4.0
Published by 3akhp — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for Arknights PRTS Wiki & game data
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_check_package_data.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_check_package_data.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: age_data.py" return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(script), "--data-root", str(data_root)], ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_check_package_data.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_e2e.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_e2e.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: python_src) proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-c", "from prts_mcp.server import main; main()"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_e2e.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_e2e_http.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_e2e_http.py:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: python_src) proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "prts_mcp.server"], stdout=subprocess.D
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_e2e_http.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sync_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sync_release.py:764`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ocesses = [ subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-c", script, str(zip_path), str(local_root),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_sync_release.py
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
find_character_appearancesno sensitive capabilityfind_speakers_inno sensitive capabilityget_operator_memoirsno sensitive capabilityget_story_summaryno sensitive capabilitylist_storiesno sensitive capabilitylist_story_eventsno sensitive capabilityprts_pageno sensitive capabilityread_activityno sensitive capabilityread_storyno sensitive capabilitysearch_prtsno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
search_storiesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.0 latest |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v2.3.1 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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