Proton Mail Bridge Client MCP Server
proton-mail-bridge-client
npm
v1.19.2
Source verified
Published by googlarz — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Proton Mail Bridge Client — full-featured CLI and Claude Desktop MCP for Proton Mail via Proton Bridge. Read, search, send, draft, archive, manage folders, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: export_email → get_audit_logs → cancel_send. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow export_email → get_audit_logs → cancel_send
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { promisify } from "node:uti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { createRequire } from "node:modu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/install-claude-desktop.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/install-claude-desktop.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { constants as fsConstants, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import { acces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/install-claude-desktop.js
Tools 96
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cancel_sendnetwork egresscreate_forward_draftnetwork egressexport_emailingests untrusted inputforward_emailnetwork egressget_attachment_contentingests untrusted inputget_audit_logsreads sensitive dataget_draftingests untrusted inputget_email_by_idingests untrusted inputget_emailsingests untrusted inputget_emails_by_idsingests untrusted input
Show 86 more tools ↓
get_foldersingests untrusted inputget_logsreads sensitive dataget_thread_by_idingests untrusted inputlist_attachmentsingests untrusted inputlist_scheduled_sendsnetwork egressprepare_meeting_contextingests untrusted inputrender_templatenetwork egresssave_attachmentsingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresssend_test_emailnetwork egressapply_thread_actionno sensitive capabilityarchive_emailno sensitive capabilitybatch_email_actionno sensitive capabilitybulk_deleteno sensitive capabilitybulk_moveno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_flagsno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_labelsno sensitive capabilitycancel_snoozeno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilityclear_indexno sensitive capabilitycount_messagesno sensitive capabilitycreate_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_reply_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_thread_reply_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_folderno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_threadno sensitive capabilityempty_folderno sensitive capabilityfind_document_threadsno sensitive capabilityflag_threadno sensitive capabilityfolder_statsno sensitive capabilityget_actionable_threadsno sensitive capabilityget_attachment_textno sensitive capabilityget_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_contactsno sensitive capabilityget_email_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_email_statsno sensitive capabilityget_follow_up_candidatesno sensitive capabilityget_inbox_digestno sensitive capabilityget_index_statusno sensitive capabilityget_labelsno sensitive capabilityget_runtime_statusno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_thread_briefno sensitive capabilityget_threadsno sensitive capabilityget_unsubscribe_infono sensitive capabilityget_volume_trendsno sensitive capabilityimport_emailno sensitive capabilitylist_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_snoozedno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymark_email_readno sensitive capabilitymove_emailno sensitive capabilitymove_threadno sensitive capabilityproton-mail-bridge-clientno sensitive capabilityrename_folderno sensitive capabilityrename_labelno sensitive capabilityreply_all_emailno sensitive capabilityreply_to_emailno sensitive capabilityrestore_emailno sensitive capabilityrun_background_syncno sensitive capabilityrun_doctorno sensitive capabilitysave_attachmentno sensitive capabilityschedule_draftno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_indexed_emailsno sensitive capabilitysend_draftno sensitive capabilitysnooze_emailno sensitive capabilitystar_emailno sensitive capabilitysync_draft_to_remoteno sensitive capabilitysync_emailsno sensitive capabilitysync_foldersno sensitive capabilitytop_sendersno sensitive capabilitytrash_emailno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_senderno sensitive capabilityupdate_draftno sensitive capabilityupdate_message_flagsno sensitive capabilityupdate_message_labelsno sensitive capabilitywait_for_mailbox_changesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (96 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.19.2 latest |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.19.0 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v1.18.10 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.18.1 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.17.1 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.17.0 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.15.0 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.11.1 |
B 89/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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