Prompt2mcp MCP Server
prompt2mcp
PyPI
v0.5.1
Published by jatintaori1904 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Build MCP servers from natural language prompts — local-first, privacy-focused
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: notion_get_page → notion_query_database → api_post. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow notion_get_page → notion_query_database → api_post
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp_factory/generator/engine.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp_factory/generator/engine.py:1549`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: => ({ ...row, [column]: eval(value) })); if (!pipeline.columns.includes(column)) pipeline.columns.push(column);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_factory/generator/engine.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_factory/cli/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_factory/cli/__init__.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [path, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_factory/cli/__init__.py
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
api_postnetwork egressapi_putnetwork egressdiscord_send_messagenetwork egressgh_create_issuenetwork egressnotify_sendnetwork egressnotify_webhooknetwork egressnotion_get_pageingests untrusted inputnotion_query_databasereads sensitive datascrape_linksingests untrusted inputscrape_pageingests untrusted input
Show 44 more tools ↓
scrape_structuredingests untrusted inputslack_send_messagenetwork egressapi_deleteno sensitive capabilityapi_getno sensitive capabilityauth_list_usersno sensitive capabilityauth_loginno sensitive capabilityauth_refreshno sensitive capabilityauth_registerno sensitive capabilityauth_verifyno sensitive capabilitydb_describe_tableno sensitive capabilitydb_executeno sensitive capabilitydb_list_tablesno sensitive capabilitydb_queryno sensitive capabilitydiscord_get_messagesno sensitive capabilitydiscord_list_channelsno sensitive capabilitydiscord_list_guildsno sensitive capabilitydoc_extract_textno sensitive capabilitydoc_infono sensitive capabilitydoc_searchno sensitive capabilityfile_infono sensitive capabilityfile_listno sensitive capabilityfile_readno sensitive capabilityfile_searchno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilitygh_get_repono sensitive capabilitygh_list_issuesno sensitive capabilitygh_list_prsno sensitive capabilitygh_list_reposno sensitive capabilitynotify_historyno sensitive capabilitynotify_list_channelsno sensitive capabilitynotion_create_pageno sensitive capabilitynotion_searchno sensitive capabilitypipe_aggregateno sensitive capabilitypipe_exportno sensitive capabilitypipe_ingestno sensitive capabilitypipe_statusno sensitive capabilitypipe_transformno sensitive capabilityslack_channel_historyno sensitive capabilityslack_channel_infono sensitive capabilityslack_list_channelsno sensitive capabilitystripe_create_customerno sensitive capabilitystripe_get_customerno sensitive capabilitystripe_list_customersno sensitive capabilitystripe_list_paymentsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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