Prompt To — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "prompt-to-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "prompt-to-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "prompt-to-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 95,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get_session_info]) co-exist with external-action tools ([webhook_endpoint_tool]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_session_info → webhook_endpoint_tool"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get_session_info] → sinks [webhook_endpoint_tool]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_session_info"
],
"sinks": [
"webhook_endpoint_tool"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_respfilter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_respfilter.py:98`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_respfilter.py"
},
"evidence": ") ns: dict = {} exec(compile(src, \"filters.py\", \"exec\"), ns) # noqa: S102 - trusted template gen_apply = ns",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_respfilter.py",
"line": 98,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_respfilter.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_respfilter.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_respfilter.py"
},
"evidence": ") ns: dict = {} exec(compile(src, \"filters.py\", \"exec\"), ns) # noqa: S102 - trusted template gen_apply = ns",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_respfilter.py",
"line": 98,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"prompt-to-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "prompt-to-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_session_info"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"webhook_endpoint_tool"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_repository_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_github",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_repository_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_pull_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_workflow_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_task_manager",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "view_security_alerts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_info",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_pets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_pet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pet_orders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_store_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "customer_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "customer_manage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invoice_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invoice_manage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refund_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refund_manage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "manage_customer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handle_payment_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invoice_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "subscription_management",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "product_management",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "price_management",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refund_handling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_endpoint_tool",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "balance_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_account_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report_run_tool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b6f4398e29568b98b1ee3c9ff63d4152833523370ab302701a0c087d6bca73cb",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}