Preflite MCP Server
preflite
npm
v2.0.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Preflight — Local mobile AI testing via MCP. AI-assisted testing on real Android/iOS/Harmony devices.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 12 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/airtest/AirtestRuntime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/airtest/AirtestRuntime.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { mkdtemp, mkdir, readFile, writeF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/airtest/AirtestRuntime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/midscene/videoRecorder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/midscene/videoRecorder.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import path from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/midscene/videoRecorder.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/midscene/zipReportDir.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/midscene/zipReportDir.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/midscene/zipReportDir.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/infrastructure/system/CommandRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/infrastructure/system/CommandRunner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; /** * 在子进程 PAT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/infrastructure/system/CommandRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/agentRuntime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/agentRuntime.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createWriteStream } from "node:fs"; import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/agentRuntime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/doctor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import http from "node:http"; import { re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { resolveSession } from "./tools-session.js"; import { getSession } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/exploration/tools-session.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/exploration/tools-session.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { createSession, getSession, destroySession, destroySessionById } from ".
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/exploration/tools-session.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/live/deviceStream.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/live/deviceStream.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import http from "node:http"; import net from "node:net"; import crypto from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/live/deviceStream.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/live/foregroundProbe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/live/foregroundProbe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { parseAndroidForegroundFromDumpsy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/live/foregroundProbe.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js:37`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`adb -H ${adbHost} -P ${adbPort} -s ${serial} shell dumpsys window 2>/dev/null | grep -
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/exploration/tools-intelligent.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/mcp/network-mocks/NetworkMockServer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/network-mocks/NetworkMockServer.js:713`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout "${keyPath}" -out "${certPath}" -day
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/network-mocks/NetworkMockServer.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/midscene-device-session.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/midscene-device-session.js:189`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Port) { const raw = execSync(`adb -H ${adbHost} -P ${adbPort} devices`, { encoding: 'utf8', }); retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/midscene-device-session.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exploration_ai_actingests untrusted inputexploration_get_page_summaryingests untrusted inputread_reportreads sensitive dataagent_healthno sensitive capabilitycancel_runno sensitive capabilityconfig_statusno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityexploration_ask_about_screenno sensitive capabilityexploration_endno sensitive capabilityexploration_screenshotno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
exploration_startno sensitive capabilityexploration_typeno sensitive capabilityexploration_waitno sensitive capabilityexport_recorded_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_network_mock_statusno sensitive capabilityget_root_ca_certno sensitive capabilityget_visual_flow_ir_rulesno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilityrun_flowno sensitive capabilitysave_reportno sensitive capabilitystart_agentno sensitive capabilitystart_ios_wdano sensitive capabilitystart_network_mocksno sensitive capabilitystart_recordingno sensitive capabilitystop_agentno sensitive capabilitystop_network_mocksno sensitive capabilitystop_recordingno sensitive capabilityupdate_network_mock_rulesno sensitive capabilityvalidate_visual_flowno sensitive capabilitywatch_runno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.3 latest |
C 77/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.0.2 |
C 77/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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