Preflight Dev — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "preflight-dev",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "preflight-dev"
},
"server": {
"name": "preflight-dev"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/git-extractor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/git-extractor.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/git-extractor.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"fs\"; import { join } from \"path\"; import { randomUUI",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/git-extractor.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/git.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { PROJECT_DIR } from \"./files.js\"; /** * Run a git command safely using",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lib/git.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/enrich-agent-task.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/enrich-agent-task.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/enrich-agent-task.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { join, basename } from \"path\"; import { createHash } from \"crypto\"; /**",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/enrich-agent-task.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/onboard-project.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/onboard-project.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/onboard-project.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { extractAndSaveContracts } from \"../lib/contracts.js\"; const GIT_DEPTH_M",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/onboard-project.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/git-extractor.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/git-extractor.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/git-extractor.ts"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"fs\"; import { join } from \"path\"; import { randomUUI",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lib/git-extractor.ts",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/git.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/git.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/git.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { PROJECT_DIR } from \"./files.js\"; import type { RunError } from \"../type",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/lib/git.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/enrich-agent-task.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/enrich-agent-task.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/enrich-agent-task.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { join, basename } from \"path\"; import { createHash } from \"crypto\"; /**",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/enrich-agent-task.ts",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/onboard-project.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/onboard-project.ts:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/onboard-project.ts"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { extractAndSaveContracts } from \"../lib/contracts.js\"; const GIT_DEPTH_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/onboard-project.ts",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/lib/embeddings.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/embeddings.js:58`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lib/embeddings.js"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings\", { method: \"POST\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/lib/embeddings.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/lib/embeddings.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/embeddings.ts:79`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/embeddings.ts"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(\"https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings\", { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/lib/embeddings.ts",
"line": 79,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "st/cli/init.js'); await import(cliPath);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "bin/cli.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "audit_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checkpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clarify_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enrich_agent_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "estimate_cost",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_scorecard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_correction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "onboard_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prompt_score",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scope_work",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_contracts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sequence_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_session_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sharpen_followup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "token_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_completion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_changed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a9ca1ef4807a875a361a4b940e0d57aa14ce6093cd60937d756758bb94a20ed1",
"stats": {
"tools": 24,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}