Foundry — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@pranesh.asp/foundry-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@pranesh.asp/foundry-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@pranesh.asp/foundry-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/anvil/start.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/anvil/start.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/anvil/start.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { checkFoundryInstalled, FOUNDRY_PATHS, FOUNDRY_NOT_INSTALLED_ERROR } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/anvil/start.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/anvil/stop.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/anvil/stop.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/anvil/stop.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import * as os from \"os\"; import { getAnvilInfo } from \"../../utils/rpc.js\"; con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/anvil/stop.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/command.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/command.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/command.js"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import * as path from \"path\"; import * as os f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/command.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/rpc.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/rpc.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/rpc.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { FOUNDRY_PATHS } from \"./command.js\"; const execAsync = promisify(exec);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/rpc.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "anvil_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_solidity_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_cfg",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_decode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_decompile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_disassemble",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_dump",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "heimdall_inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_eth_units",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a98510f6e8a989a859534ed3254970bc953c426d0fb559e70e58b2fdee9fc7e0",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}