Pptagent MCP Server
pptagent
PyPI
v1.1.37
Published by icip-cas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An Agentic Framework for Reflective PowerPoint Generation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (pptagent/apis.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`pptagent/apis.py:186`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, doc) eval(line, SAFE_EVAL_GLOBALS, {func: partial_func}) self.code_history[-1][0] = H
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pptagent/apis.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (pptagent/apis.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`pptagent/apis.py:186`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, doc) eval(line, SAFE_EVAL_GLOBALS, {func: partial_func}) self.code_history[-1][0] = H
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pptagent/apis.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (deeppresenter/cli/common.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deeppresenter/cli/common.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subpro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deeppresenter/cli/common.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (deeppresenter/cli/dependency.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deeppresenter/cli/dependency.py:274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "images", "-q", SANDBOX_IMAGE], capture_outpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deeppresenter/cli/dependency.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (deeppresenter/cli/model.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`deeppresenter/cli/model.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, env=env, text=True, stdou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server deeppresenter/cli/model.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pptagent/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pptagent/utils.py:517`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: name, ] subprocess.run(command_list, check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL) assert exists(filepath)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pptagent/utils.py
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_fileingests untrusted inputfetch_urlingests untrusted inputsearch_webingests untrusted inputask_userno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_markdownno sensitive capabilitydocument_summaryno sensitive capabilityfinalizeno sensitive capabilityget_paper_authorsno sensitive capabilityget_scholar_detailsno sensitive capabilityimage_captionno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
image_generationno sensitive capabilityinspect_manuscriptno sensitive capabilityinspect_slideno sensitive capabilitysearch_imagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_papersno sensitive capabilitythinkingno sensitive capabilitytodo_createno sensitive capabilitytodo_listno sensitive capabilitytodo_updateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.37 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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