Powerbi (AjvoGod) MCP Server
powerbi-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by ajvogod — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Power BI — workspace management, dataset operations, report export, PBIX local analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/pbix/desktopModelExtractor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/pbix/desktopModelExtractor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'fs'; import { j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/pbix/desktopModelExtractor.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_export, export_report_and_download]) co-exist with external-action tools ([download_export]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_export, export_report_and_download] → sinks [download_export]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_export → download_export
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { copyFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, resolve }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/start-mcp.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/start-mcp.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/start-mcp.mjs
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_exportingests untrusted inputnetwork egressexport_report_and_downloadingests untrusted inputclone_reportno sensitive capabilityexport_reportno sensitive capabilityget_activity_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_capacity_workloadsno sensitive capabilityget_dashboard_tilesno sensitive capabilityget_dataflowno sensitive capabilityget_dataflow_datasourcesno sensitive capabilityget_datasetno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
get_dataset_datasourcesno sensitive capabilityget_dataset_parametersno sensitive capabilityget_dataset_refresh_historyno sensitive capabilityget_dataset_refresh_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_dataset_tablesno sensitive capabilityget_export_statusno sensitive capabilityget_gateway_datasourcesno sensitive capabilityget_reportno sensitive capabilityget_report_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_workspaceno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_capacitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_dashboardsno sensitive capabilitylist_dataflowsno sensitive capabilitylist_datasetsno sensitive capabilitylist_gatewaysno sensitive capabilitylist_reportsno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitypbix_analyzeno sensitive capabilitypbix_batch_analyzeno sensitive capabilitypbix_compareno sensitive capabilitypbix_describe_reportno sensitive capabilitypbix_discover_desktop_modelsno sensitive capabilitypbix_extract_desktop_semantic_modelno sensitive capabilitypbix_extract_layoutno sensitive capabilitypbix_extract_mcodeno sensitive capabilitypbix_extract_metadatano sensitive capabilitypbix_generate_documentationno sensitive capabilitypbix_list_datasourcesno sensitive capabilityrebind_reportno sensitive capabilityscan_workspacesno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilitytrigger_dataflow_refreshno sensitive capabilitytrigger_dataset_refreshno sensitive capabilityupdate_dataset_parametersno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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