Photon MCP Server
@portel/photon
npm
v1.36.1
Published by @portel — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Build MCP servers, CLI tools, and web dashboards for AI agents from a single TypeScript file.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 26.4 = 74. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server MTC-SRC-011 | injection |
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 74 − 7 = 67. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/template-manager.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/template-manager.js:182`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...keys, 'process', 'require', 'globalThis', 'global', 'return (' + expr + ')');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/template-manager.js
high Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same serverMTC-SRC-011
The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`dist/template-manager.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).
Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.
Location: server implementation
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/template-manager.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/template-manager.js:182`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(...keys, 'process', 'require', 'globalThis', 'global', 'return (' + expr + ')');
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/template-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-ui/beam.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-ui/beam.js:2852`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); spawn(process.execPath, process.argv.slice(1), {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-ui/beam.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-ui/beam/routes/api-config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-ui/beam/routes/api-config.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { isLocalRequest, readBody, getCorsO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-ui/beam/routes/api-config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/beam.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/beam.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { getErrorMessage, ExitCode, exitWithError, handleError, } from '../../sh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/beam.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/changelog.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/changelog.js:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); // If specific version requested, just show it if (requ
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/changelog.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/dev.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/dev.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { getDefaultContext, resolvePhotonFr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/dev.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); const pm = detectPM(); const pmVersion = execSy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/info.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/info.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); try { // Try bun global root first, then npm let globalRoot
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/info.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/init.js:582`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); photonExe = platform === 'win32'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/maker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/maker.js:684`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); execSync(installCmd, { cwd: destUiDir, stdio: 'inherit' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/maker.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/commands/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js:140`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const pmVersion = execSync(`${pm} --version`, { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim(); diagnostics['Package
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/doctor.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/commands/init.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/init.js:661`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess'); execSync(`schtasks /create /tn "${taskName}" /tr "${photonExe} daemon start" /sc onlogon /f`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/init.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/context-store.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/context-store.js:215`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const tty = execSync(`ps -o tty= -p ${process.pid}`, { encoding: 'utf-8', st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/context-store.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/loader.js:485`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }, require(key) { const value = this.get(key); if (value ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/loader.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/photons/marketplace.photon.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/photons/marketplace.photon.js:14`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { return (await import(moduleId)); } catch { // Internal photons are cached before execution, so
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/photons/marketplace.photon.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/photons/marketplace.photon.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/photons/marketplace.photon.ts:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { return (await import(moduleId)) as typeof import('../marketplace-manager.js'); } catch { // Internal pho
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/photons/marketplace.photon.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/shared/sqlite-runtime.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/sqlite-runtime.js:110`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: w Function('m', 'return import(m)')(modName); } /** * Internal: reset the cached constructor. For tests only. */ expor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/sqlite-runtime.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/commands/build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/commands/build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import ora from 'ora'; import chalk from 'chalk'; import { printError } from '..
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/build.js
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
_instancesno sensitive capability_redono sensitive capability_undono sensitive capability_useno sensitive capabilitysetupno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.36.1 latest |
D 67/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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