Pomera Ai Commander (matbanik) MCP Server
pomera-ai-commander
PyPI
v1.5.1
Published by matbanik — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −22 | Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 18
high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_detect_secrets_integration.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_detect_secrets_integration.py:10`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_detect_secrets_integration.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py:312`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/pomera-ai-commander.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/pomera-ai-commander.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/pomera-ai-commander.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/pomera-create-shortcut.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/pomera-create-shortcut.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/pomera-create-shortcut.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/pomera.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/pomera.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/pomera.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bump_version.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bump_version.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bump_version.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (core/load_presets_dialog.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`core/load_presets_dialog.py:446`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/load_presets_dialog.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (core/mcp/tool_registry.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`core/mcp/tool_registry.py:7254`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/mcp/tool_registry.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (create_shortcut.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`create_shortcut.py:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server create_shortcut.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (pomera.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pomera.py:7183`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pomera.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/postinstall.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/validate-release-workflow.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/validate-release-workflow.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/validate-release-workflow.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (core/mcp/tool_registry.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`core/mcp/tool_registry.py:5122`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: requests.post(
"https://api.exa.ai/search"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/mcp/tool_registry.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (pomera.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`pomera.py:6462`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: requests.post(
"https://api.exa.ai/search"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pomera.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (tools/web_search.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`tools/web_search.py:446`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: requests.post(
"https://api.exa.ai/search"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/web_search.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py:311`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_smart_diff_fuzz.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (core/content_hash_cache.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`core/content_hash_cache.py:416`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/content_hash_cache.py
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"pomera-ai-commander" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package pomera-ai-commander
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.1 latest |
C 70/100 | 18 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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