Polyscreen MCP Server
polyscreen-mcp
npm
v0.7.0
Published by zyzto — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Capability-driven Android automation MCP server with first-class multi-display and gamepad support
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/android/adb-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/android/adb-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; export function quoteRemoteShellArg(va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/android/adb-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/android/logcat-sessions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/android/logcat-sessions.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { Transform } from "node:stream"; import { finished } from "node:stream/p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/android/logcat-sessions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/android/recording-analyze.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/android/recording-analyze.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, readFile, realpath, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/android/recording-analyze.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/companion.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/companion.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import { Socket } from "node:net"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends/companion.js
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mobile_notification_getingests untrusted inputmobile_notifications_listingests untrusted inputmobile_analyze_recordingno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_inspectno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_installno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_launchno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_prefs_readno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_relaunch_on_displaysno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_stopno sensitive capabilitymobile_app_uninstallno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
mobile_artifacts_listno sensitive capabilitymobile_artifacts_pruneno sensitive capabilitymobile_broadcast_sendno sensitive capabilitymobile_companion_installno sensitive capabilitymobile_companion_keyno sensitive capabilitymobile_companion_startno sensitive capabilitymobile_companion_stopno sensitive capabilitymobile_companion_windowsno sensitive capabilitymobile_default_app_clearno sensitive capabilitymobile_default_app_getno sensitive capabilitymobile_default_app_setno sensitive capabilitymobile_default_apps_listno sensitive capabilitymobile_device_inspectno sensitive capabilitymobile_devices_listno sensitive capabilitymobile_diagnostics_activity_topsno sensitive capabilitymobile_diagnostics_collectno sensitive capabilitymobile_diagnostics_layer_hintsno sensitive capabilitymobile_displays_listno sensitive capabilitymobile_file_pullno sensitive capabilitymobile_file_pushno sensitive capabilitymobile_focus_traceno sensitive capabilitymobile_focus_trace_startno sensitive capabilitymobile_focus_trace_stopno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_dragno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_keyno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_key_combinationno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_swipeno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_tapno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_textno sensitive capabilitymobile_logcatno sensitive capabilitymobile_logcat_startno sensitive capabilitymobile_logcat_stopno sensitive capabilitymobile_notification_postno sensitive capabilitymobile_packages_listno sensitive capabilitymobile_performance_snapshotno sensitive capabilitymobile_permission_setno sensitive capabilitymobile_power_wakeno sensitive capabilitymobile_record_markno sensitive capabilitymobile_record_startno sensitive capabilitymobile_record_stopno sensitive capabilitymobile_screen_captureno sensitive capabilitymobile_screen_capture_pairno sensitive capabilitymobile_screen_recordno sensitive capabilitymobile_server_infono sensitive capabilitymobile_sessions_statusno sensitive capabilitymobile_theme_flash_reportno sensitive capabilitymobile_ui_findno sensitive capabilitymobile_ui_snapshotno sensitive capabilitymobile_ui_waitno sensitive capabilitymobile_uimode_getno sensitive capabilitymobile_uimode_setno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.6.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v0.4.2 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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