Joan MCP Server

@pollychrome/joan-mcp npm v2.5.0

Published by @pollychrome — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Joan productivity app - enables AI assistants to manage projects, tasks, goals, milestones, and notes

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/cli.js

medium Tool "unlink_task_from_goal" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "unlink_task_from_goal" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool unlink_task_from_goal

medium Tool "unlink_task_from_milestone" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "unlink_task_from_milestone" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool unlink_task_from_milestone

low Mutating tool "unlink_task_from_goal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "unlink_task_from_goal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool unlink_task_from_goal

low Mutating tool "unlink_task_from_milestone" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "unlink_task_from_milestone" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool unlink_task_from_milestone

Tools 75

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_attachment_download_urlingests untrusted input
  • unlink_task_from_goalwrites files
  • unlink_task_from_milestonewrites files
  • upload_attachmentingests untrusted input
  • add_tag_to_taskno sensitive capability
  • bulk_update_tasksno sensitive capability
  • complete_taskno sensitive capability
  • confirm_daily_planno sensitive capability
  • create_columnno sensitive capability
  • create_goalno sensitive capability
Show 65 more tools ↓
  • create_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • create_milestone_commentno sensitive capability
  • create_milestone_resourceno sensitive capability
  • create_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_project_resourceno sensitive capability
  • create_project_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_taskno sensitive capability
  • create_task_commentno sensitive capability
  • create_task_resourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_columnno sensitive capability
  • delete_goalno sensitive capability
  • delete_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • delete_milestone_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_milestone_resourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_noteno sensitive capability
  • delete_project_resourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_project_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_task_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_task_resourceno sensitive capability
  • generate_daily_planno sensitive capability
  • get_actionable_tasksno sensitive capability
  • get_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • get_daily_planno sensitive capability
  • get_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • get_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_project_attachment_hierarchyno sensitive capability
  • get_project_tagno sensitive capability
  • get_storage_usageno sensitive capability
  • get_taskno sensitive capability
  • get_task_tagsno sensitive capability
  • link_task_to_goalno sensitive capability
  • link_tasks_to_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • list_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_columnsno sensitive capability
  • list_goalsno sensitive capability
  • list_milestone_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_milestone_resourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_milestonesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_resourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_task_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_task_resourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • remove_tag_from_taskno sensitive capability
  • reorder_columnsno sensitive capability
  • search_tasksno sensitive capability
  • set_task_tagsno sensitive capability
  • update_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • update_columnno sensitive capability
  • update_daily_planno sensitive capability
  • update_goalno sensitive capability
  • update_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • update_milestone_commentno sensitive capability
  • update_milestone_resourceno sensitive capability
  • update_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_projectno sensitive capability
  • update_project_resourceno sensitive capability
  • update_project_tagno sensitive capability
  • update_taskno sensitive capability
  • update_task_commentno sensitive capability
  • update_task_resourceno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.5.0 latest A 93/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v2.4.0 A 93/100 5 1.9.0 2026-07-24

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @pollychrome/joan-mcp --online

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