Poe2 MCP Server
poe2-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.11
Published by hivemindoverlord — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI-powered Path of Exile 2 build optimization MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/data/update_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/data/update_manager.py:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( [git, "-C", str(_BASE_DIR), *args], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/data/update_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/launcher_helpers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/launcher_helpers.py:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: out=10): return subprocess.run( [git, *args], cwd=Path.cwd(), capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/launcher_helpers.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (launch.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`launch.py:120`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(package) except ImportError: missing.append(package) if miss
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server launch.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (src/api/cache_manager.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`src/api/cache_manager.py:159`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: value = pickle.loads(value_blob) # Store in higher tiers for next time
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/api/cache_manager.py
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_characteringests untrusted inputcheck_tree_freshnessingests untrusted inputcompare_to_top_playersingests untrusted inputget_pob_codeingests untrusted inputreport_erroringests untrusted inputanalyze_passive_treeno sensitive capabilitycalculate_character_dpsno sensitive capabilitycheck_for_updatesno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilityexplain_mechanicno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
export_pobno sensitive capabilityfind_stat_sourcesno sensitive capabilityget_available_modsno sensitive capabilityget_formulano sensitive capabilityget_game_configno sensitive capabilityget_live_game_stateno sensitive capabilityget_mod_tiersno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilityimport_pobno sensitive capabilityimport_poe_ninja_urlno sensitive capabilityinspect_base_itemno sensitive capabilityinspect_keystoneno sensitive capabilityinspect_modno sensitive capabilityinspect_passive_nodeno sensitive capabilityinspect_spell_gemno sensitive capabilityinspect_support_gemno sensitive capabilitylist_all_base_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_keystonesno sensitive capabilitylist_all_modsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_notablesno sensitive capabilitylist_all_spellsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_supportsno sensitive capabilitypob_get_buildno sensitive capabilitypob_get_calcsno sensitive capabilitypob_get_passive_treeno sensitive capabilitypob_install_addonno sensitive capabilitypob_load_buildno sensitive capabilitypob_statusno sensitive capabilityreconcile_defensive_statsno sensitive capabilitysearch_itemsno sensitive capabilitysearch_mods_by_statno sensitive capabilitysearch_trade_itemsno sensitive capabilitysetup_trade_authno sensitive capabilityvalidate_build_constraintsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_item_modsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_support_combinationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.11 latest |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.0.10 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1.0.8 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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