Podman (PyPI) MCP Server
podman-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server that exposes Podman container management as tools for AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([container_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_in_container]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [container_logs] → sinks [exec_in_container]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow container_logs → exec_in_container
high Tool "exec_in_container" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_in_container" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_in_container
high Shell/command execution in server code (podman_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`podman_mcp/server.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r) -> str: result = subprocess.run( f"podman {cmd}", shell=True, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server podman_mcp/server.py
low Mutating tool "exec_in_container" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_in_container" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_in_container
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
container_logsreads sensitive dataexec_in_containerruns code / shellbuild_imageno sensitive capabilitycontainer_diffno sensitive capabilitycontainer_portno sensitive capabilitycontainer_statsno sensitive capabilitycontainer_topno sensitive capabilitycopy_to_containerno sensitive capabilitygenerate_kubeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_systemdno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
image_historyno sensitive capabilityinspect_containerno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilityload_imageno sensitive capabilitylogin_registryno sensitive capabilitynetwork_connectno sensitive capabilitynetwork_createno sensitive capabilitynetwork_disconnectno sensitive capabilitynetwork_inspectno sensitive capabilitynetwork_listno sensitive capabilitynetwork_pruneno sensitive capabilitynetwork_removeno sensitive capabilitypause_containerno sensitive capabilitypod_createno sensitive capabilitypod_inspectno sensitive capabilitypod_listno sensitive capabilitypod_removeno sensitive capabilitypod_restartno sensitive capabilitypod_startno sensitive capabilitypod_statsno sensitive capabilitypod_stopno sensitive capabilitypodman_infono sensitive capabilitypodman_versionno sensitive capabilityprune_imagesno sensitive capabilitypull_imageno sensitive capabilitypush_imageno sensitive capabilityremove_containerno sensitive capabilityremove_imageno sensitive capabilityrename_containerno sensitive capabilityrestart_containerno sensitive capabilityrun_containerno sensitive capabilitysave_imageno sensitive capabilitysearch_imageno sensitive capabilitysecret_createno sensitive capabilitysecret_inspectno sensitive capabilitysecret_listno sensitive capabilitysecret_removeno sensitive capabilitystart_containerno sensitive capabilitystop_containerno sensitive capabilitysystem_eventsno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitysystem_pruneno sensitive capabilitytag_imageno sensitive capabilityunpause_containerno sensitive capabilityvolume_createno sensitive capabilityvolume_inspectno sensitive capabilityvolume_listno sensitive capabilityvolume_pruneno sensitive capabilityvolume_removeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan podman-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Podman 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for container runtimes (Podman and Docker)
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for container runtimes (Podman and Docker)
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