Podium MCP Server
podium-mcp
npm
v0.5.0
Published by hoainho — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Mobile + canvas automation MCP for AI agents — one stdio server, 60 tools: iOS (simulator + real) & Android control, native UI automation, Maestro E2E flows, evidenced oracle-ladder assertions, React Native/Metro debugging, WebView DOM + network capture,
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "webview_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "webview_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool webview_eval
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/webview.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/webview.js:70`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "post-navigation eval (not document-start), so a Rive built synchronously during the initial " + "hard lo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/webview.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { access, constants } from "node:f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/maestro.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/maestro.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; /** * Private execFile, INDEPENDENT of e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/maestro.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/recording.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/recording.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { run, commandExists } from "./e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/recording.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/intent.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/intent.js:105`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await exec("xcrun", ["simctl", "launch", udid, bundleId], { timeout: 15_000 }); return r.code;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/intent.js
low Mutating tool "webview_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "webview_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool webview_eval
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
webview_evalruns code / shellapp_installno sensitive capabilityapp_launchno sensitive capabilityapp_listno sensitive capabilityapp_stateno sensitive capabilityapp_terminateno sensitive capabilityapp_uninstallno sensitive capabilityassert_not_visibleno sensitive capabilityassert_textno sensitive capabilityassert_visibleno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
canvas_inspectno sensitive capabilitycanvas_resolveno sensitive capabilitycanvas_tapno sensitive capabilitycheat_sheetno sensitive capabilitycrash_getno sensitive capabilitycrash_listno sensitive capabilitydevice_bootno sensitive capabilitydevice_listno sensitive capabilityengine_callno sensitive capabilityengine_inspectno sensitive capabilityengine_swipeno sensitive capabilityengine_tapno sensitive capabilityexport_flowno sensitive capabilityinput_textno sensitive capabilityinspect_screenno sensitive capabilitymetro_appsno sensitive capabilitymetro_logsno sensitive capabilitymetro_networkno sensitive capabilitymetro_stateno sensitive capabilitynotification_bar_clearno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilityorientation_getno sensitive capabilityorientation_setno sensitive capabilitypodium_token_reportno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrecord_startno sensitive capabilityrecord_stopno sensitive capabilityrive_analyzeno sensitive capabilityrive_e2e_initno sensitive capabilityrive_eventsno sensitive capabilityrive_fireno sensitive capabilityrive_inspectno sensitive capabilityrive_runno sensitive capabilityrive_setno sensitive capabilityrive_set_textno sensitive capabilityrun_flowno sensitive capabilityrun_intentno sensitive capabilityrun_stepsno sensitive capabilityscreen_sizeno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityset_locationno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytap_onno sensitive capabilitytap_with_fallbackno sensitive capabilityvalidate_flowno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywebview_inspectno sensitive capabilitywebview_navigateno sensitive capabilitywebview_networkno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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