Plumb MCP Server
plumb-mcp
npm
v0.13.2
Published by tathagat22 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The two-way Figma MCP server: extract designs as compact specs and verify your code with a built-in loop (design → code), OR turn a prompt into a full, on-brand Figma design directed by an AI design director that researches references, extracts a brand, a
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:614`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; var MAC_CANDIDATES = [ "/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:648`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { const out = execSync(`${which} ${cmd}`, { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).toString().trim().split(/\r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
plumb_assetsno sensitive capabilityplumb_brandno sensitive capabilityplumb_componentsno sensitive capabilityplumb_describeno sensitive capabilityplumb_designno sensitive capabilityplumb_fig_nodeno sensitive capabilityplumb_fig_outlineno sensitive capabilityplumb_fitno sensitive capabilityplumb_nodeno sensitive capabilityplumb_outlineno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
plumb_queryno sensitive capabilityplumb_reviewno sensitive capabilityplumb_screenshotno sensitive capabilityplumb_searchno sensitive capabilityplumb_selectionno sensitive capabilityplumb_sourceno sensitive capabilityplumb_statusno sensitive capabilityplumb_studiono sensitive capabilityplumb_studio_kitno sensitive capabilityplumb_studio_pageno sensitive capabilityplumb_studio_startno sensitive capabilityplumb_tokensno sensitive capabilityplumb_verifyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.2 latest |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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