Pluglayer MCP Server
pluglayer-mcp
PyPI
v0.26.9061002.34026277783.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
PlugLayer MCP server — deploy and manage infrastructure via AI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_app_logs, get_logs, get_app_connection_env_vars]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_app_terminal]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_app_logs, get_logs, get_app_connection_env_vars] → sinks [exec_app_terminal]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_app_logs → exec_app_terminal
high Tool "exec_app_terminal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_app_terminal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_app_terminal
high Shell/command execution in server code (pluglayer_mcp/tools/cicd_health.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`pluglayer_mcp/tools/cicd_health.py:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -> str: completed = subprocess.run( ["git", *args], cwd=repo_path, check=True, captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server pluglayer_mcp/tools/cicd_health.py
low Mutating tool "exec_app_terminal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_app_terminal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_app_terminal
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_codex_plugin_installer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_codex_plugin_installer.py:75`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : "1", } return subprocess.run( ["bash", str(INSTALLER)], cwd=tmp_path, env=env,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_codex_plugin_installer.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_plugin_component_manifests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_plugin_component_manifests.py:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r), } result = subprocess.run( ["/bin/bash", "-c", cursor_command], env=env, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_plugin_component_manifests.py
Tools 96
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_app_terminalruns code / shellget_app_connection_env_varsreads sensitive dataget_app_logsreads sensitive dataget_logsreads sensitive dataadd_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityanalyze_compose_deploy_planno sensitive capabilityapply_app_env_varsno sensitive capabilityattach_custom_domainno sensitive capabilityattach_node_to_projectno sensitive capabilitycheck_database_slug_availabilityno sensitive capability
Show 86 more tools ↓
check_plugin_updatesno sensitive capabilitycheck_slug_availabilityno sensitive capabilityclone_template_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_databaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_template_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_template_launch_sessionno sensitive capabilitydelete_appno sensitive capabilitydelete_databaseno sensitive capabilitydelete_deploymentno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_template_draftno sensitive capabilitydeploy_composeno sensitive capabilitydeploy_imageno sensitive capabilitydeploy_marketplace_templateno sensitive capabilitydetach_custom_domainno sensitive capabilitydetach_node_from_projectno sensitive capabilitydetect_custom_domain_providerno sensitive capabilityestimate_computeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_github_actionsno sensitive capabilityget_app_access_policyno sensitive capabilityget_apps_by_projectno sensitive capabilityget_compose_local_build_commandsno sensitive capabilityget_compute_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_database_connection_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_database_logsno sensitive capabilityget_deployment_statusno sensitive capabilityget_domains_by_projectno sensitive capabilityget_feedbackno sensitive capabilityget_marketplace_templateno sensitive capabilityget_my_available_computeno sensitive capabilityget_my_available_computesno sensitive capabilityget_my_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_shared_compute_pricingno sensitive capabilityget_task_statusno sensitive capabilityget_template_agent_contextno sensitive capabilityget_template_authoring_schemano sensitive capabilityget_template_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_user_contextno sensitive capabilityinspect_local_github_repono sensitive capabilitylist_attachable_project_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_database_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_deploymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_marketplace_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_feedbackno sensitive capabilitylist_my_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_pluglayer_compute_optionsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_registriesno sensitive capabilitylist_template_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_template_launch_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_databasesno sensitive capabilitymark_notification_readno sensitive capabilityplan_dedicated_computeno sensitive capabilityplan_template_launchno sensitive capabilitypreview_template_composeno sensitive capabilityredeployno sensitive capabilityremove_appno sensitive capabilityremove_databaseno sensitive capabilityremove_projectno sensitive capabilityrename_projectno sensitive capabilityrequest_extra_computeno sensitive capabilityrestart_appno sensitive capabilityrestart_databaseno sensitive capabilityrollbackno sensitive capabilityrun_template_agentno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitysubmit_template_for_approvalno sensitive capabilitysync_database_env_to_appno sensitive capabilityupdate_app_access_policyno sensitive capabilityupdate_app_domainno sensitive capabilityupdate_app_from_templateno sensitive capabilityupdate_database_accessno sensitive capabilityupdate_my_feedbackno sensitive capabilityupdate_pluginno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_metadatano sensitive capabilityupdate_template_draftno sensitive capabilityupdate_user_contextno sensitive capabilityupload_image_archive_and_deployno sensitive capabilityupload_image_archive_and_redeploy_appno sensitive capabilityverify_custom_domainno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (96 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.26.9061002.34026277783.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.26.9051318.33968518121.1 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.26.9040104.33824287778.1 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.26.9010301.33464684368.1 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.26.8310203.33349476653.1 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v0.26.8240616.32696597087.1 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.26.7311221.30630288023.1 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
v0.26.7261403.30205305251.1 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.26.72002 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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