Playback MCP Server
playback-mcp
npm
v0.2.7
Source verified
Published by blaisemoses01 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server that controls YouTube playback in your browser via the Playback MCP extension — play, seek, loop sections, save timestamps, build a video library
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bridge.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bridge.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/captions.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/captions.js:31`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch('https://www.youtube.com/youtubei/v1/player?prettyPrint=false', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/captions.js
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_timestampno sensitive capabilityfind_videosno sensitive capabilityget_stateno sensitive capabilityget_transcriptno sensitive capabilitylist_timestampsno sensitive capabilityloop_sectionno sensitive capabilityopen_videono sensitive capabilitypauseno sensitive capabilityplayno sensitive capabilityplay_sequenceno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
save_timestampno sensitive capabilitysave_videono sensitive capabilitysearch_transcriptno sensitive capabilityseekno sensitive capabilityset_speedno sensitive capabilityset_volumeno sensitive capabilitystop_loopno sensitive capabilitystop_sequenceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.7 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.6 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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