Pkagentic MCP Server
@pkagentic/mcp
npm
v1.9.4
Published by @pkagentic — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "save_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "save_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool save_script
high Tool "create_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_script
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_file, get_files_batch, download_image, cdn_download_library]) co-exist with external-action tools ([save_script, create_script]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_file, get_files_batch, download_image, cdn_download_library] → sinks [save_script, create_script]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_file → save_script
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_image"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_image" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_image · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_mode" on "save_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "save_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_mode" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool save_script · inputSchema.properties.script_mode
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_mode" on "create_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_mode" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_script · inputSchema.properties.script_mode
low Mutating tool "save_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "save_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool save_script
low Mutating tool "create_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_script
Tools 85
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cdn_download_libraryingests untrusted inputcreate_scriptruns code / shelldownload_imageingests untrusted inputget_fileingests untrusted inputget_files_batchingests untrusted inputsave_scriptruns code / shelladd_menu_itemno sensitive capabilityadd_post_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityassign_menu_locationno sensitive capabilitycreate_blog_postno sensitive capability
Show 75 more tools ↓
create_contentno sensitive capabilitycreate_libraryno sensitive capabilitycreate_nav_menuno sensitive capabilitycreate_taxonomyno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_libraryno sensitive capabilitydelete_menu_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_nav_menuno sensitive capabilitydelete_scriptno sensitive capabilitydelete_templateno sensitive capabilitydraft_blog_postno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilityget_agent_guideno sensitive capabilityget_blog_postno sensitive capabilityget_content_infono sensitive capabilityget_image_srcsetno sensitive capabilityget_libraryno sensitive capabilityget_nav_menuno sensitive capabilityget_rolesno sensitive capabilityget_script_infono sensitive capabilityget_script_revisionsno sensitive capabilityget_seo_datano sensitive capabilityget_site_infono sensitive capabilityget_tailwind_configno sensitive capabilityget_template_infono sensitive capabilityget_template_revisionsno sensitive capabilityinit_projectno sensitive capabilitylist_blog_postsno sensitive capabilitylist_librariesno sensitive capabilitylist_menu_locationsno sensitive capabilitylist_nav_menusno sensitive capabilitylist_taxonomyno sensitive capabilitymark_content_editno sensitive capabilityoptimize_imageno sensitive capabilitypublish_blog_postno sensitive capabilitypublish_contentno sensitive capabilitypublish_scriptno sensitive capabilitypublish_templateno sensitive capabilityread_web_pageno sensitive capabilityremove_post_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityrestore_library_backupno sensitive capabilityrestore_script_revisionno sensitive capabilityrestore_template_revisionno sensitive capabilitysave_blog_postno sensitive capabilitysave_contentno sensitive capabilitysave_library_filesno sensitive capabilitysave_templateno sensitive capabilityschedule_blog_postno sensitive capabilitysearch_blog_postsno sensitive capabilitysearch_contentsno sensitive capabilitysearch_librariesno sensitive capabilitysearch_mediano sensitive capabilitysearch_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityset_feature_imageno sensitive capabilitysyncno sensitive capabilitytailwind_optimizeno sensitive capabilitytoggle_libraryno sensitive capabilitytoggle_library_lockno sensitive capabilitytoggle_scriptno sensitive capabilitytoggle_templateno sensitive capabilityunassign_menu_locationno sensitive capabilityupdate_agent_guideno sensitive capabilityupdate_contentno sensitive capabilityupdate_libraryno sensitive capabilityupdate_library_conditionsno sensitive capabilityupdate_menu_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_nav_menuno sensitive capabilityupdate_post_excerptno sensitive capabilityupdate_scriptno sensitive capabilityupdate_script_conditionsno sensitive capabilityupdate_seo_datano sensitive capabilityupdate_tailwind_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_templateno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_conditionsno sensitive capabilityupload_mediano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (85 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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