Pixelcheck MCP Server
pixelcheck
npm
v2.1.0
Source verified
Published by xcodethink — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP-first browser primitives for AI agents — real eyes and hands on the web. Local-first. Vendor-agnostic. Yours to own.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/browser-install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/browser-install.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; import { URL } from "node:url"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/browser-install.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/core/notify.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/notify.js:45`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/sendMessage`, { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/notify.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/core/plugin.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/plugin.js:85`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(fullPath); const plugin = mod.default ?? mod; if (plugin && plugi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/plugin.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/handlers/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/index.js:538`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await import(handlerPath)); if (!mod.default) { throw new Error(`Custom handler ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/handlers/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"pixelcheck" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package pixelcheck
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.4.4 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.4.3 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v1.4.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.3.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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