Pinepaper.studio MCP Server

@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server npm v1.5.5

Published by @pinepaper.studio — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
C
78/100
Last scanned
Trust
C · 78/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
C Why this grade 100 − 22.1 = 78/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−15.4 Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 injection
−6.7 Possible combosquat of mcp ×4 MTC-SUP-006 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 9

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js:216`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/browser/bridge.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/bridge.js:250`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/browser/bridge.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js:216`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.d.ts)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.d.ts:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.d.ts

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.js:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.js

medium Possible combosquat of mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @playwright/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@playwright/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@playwright/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @stripe/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@stripe/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@stripe/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @browsermcp/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@browsermcp/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@browsermcp/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.5.5 latest C 78/100 9 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: C · 78/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server --online

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