@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server
npm
v1.5.5
Published by @pinepaper.studio — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −6.7 | Possible combosquat of mcp ×4 MTC-SUP-006 | supply-chain |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js:216`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/bridge.js:250`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/bridge.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js:216`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/puppeteer-controller.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.d.ts:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.d.ts
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.js:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/p5-compat/p5-helpers.js
"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.
Fix: Confirm you meant "mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server
"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@playwright/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@playwright/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server
"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@stripe/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@stripe/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server
"@pinepaper.studio/mcp-server" is "@browsermcp/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@browsermcp/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.5 latest |
C 78/100 | 9 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @pinepaper.studio/mcp-server --online
Security scan results for the 19hz MCP server.
Security scan results for the 4oimage MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ableton MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ableton Live MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ableton Mind MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe MCP server.