Pincushion MCP Server
pincushion-mcp
npm
v1.11.14
Published by jcooley8 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Visual feedback as agent work packets. Stakeholders drop pins on your live app; your AI coding agent reads each pin (selector, screenshot, DOM, thread, acceptance criteria) via MCP and ships the fix.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/deployment-frame-runtime.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/deployment-frame-runtime.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nodeSpawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/deployment-frame-runtime.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/deployment-providers/vercel.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/deployment-providers/vercel.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { redactProviderResult } from './contracts.js'; import { buildManualProv
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/deployment-providers/vercel.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/git.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/ownership.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/ownership.mjs:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; export function readVercelToken() { if (process.env.VERCEL_TOKEN) return proc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/ownership.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (login.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`login.mjs:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir, plat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server login.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile-wall.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile-wall.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, copy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile-wall.mjs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_reply_candidates, add_bot_reply, fix_and_resolve]) co-exist with external-action tools ([manage_deployment_automation, configure_collaboration_integration, claim_pending_slack_install, remove_collaboration_integration, preview_collaboration_notification]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_reply_candidates, add_bot_reply, fix_and_resolve] → sinks [manage_deployment_automation, configure_collaboration_integration, claim_pending_slack
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_reply_candidates → manage_deployment_automation
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build-mcpb.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build-mcpb.mjs:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { cpSync, rmSync, mkdirSync, copyFileSync, existsSync, readFileSync, stat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build-mcpb.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/capture-snapshot.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/capture-snapshot.mjs:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { collectAuthenticationChallengeSignals, collectSemanticFingerprint,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/capture-snapshot.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/preflight.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/preflight.mjs:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { builtinModules } from 'node:module'; const ROOT = join(dirname(fileURL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/preflight.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/release-fallback.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/release-fallback.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { inspectRegistryRelease, inspe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/release-fallback.mjs
Tools 67
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_bot_replyingests untrusted inputclaim_pending_slack_installnetwork egressconfigure_collaboration_integrationnetwork egressfix_and_resolveingests untrusted inputget_reply_candidatesingests untrusted inputmanage_deployment_automationnetwork egresspreview_collaboration_notificationnetwork egressremove_collaboration_integrationnetwork egressadd_agent_replyno sensitive capabilityadd_memberno sensitive capability
Show 57 more tools ↓
approve_pinno sensitive capabilityassign_pin_to_agentno sensitive capabilityclaim_pinno sensitive capabilitycomplete_critique_requestno sensitive capabilitycomplete_deployment_capture_runno sensitive capabilityconfigure_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_agent_pinno sensitive capabilitycreate_critique_pinno sensitive capabilitycreate_invite_linkno sensitive capabilitycreate_share_reportno sensitive capabilitycreate_slack_install_linkno sensitive capabilityemailsno sensitive capabilityfeedback-summaryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_critique_reportno sensitive capabilityget_actionable_pinsno sensitive capabilityget_annotationsno sensitive capabilityget_component_feedbackno sensitive capabilityget_deployment_reconciliation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_feedback_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_implementation_packetno sensitive capabilityget_pending_critiquesno sensitive capabilityget_pending_deployment_frame_refreshesno sensitive capabilityget_project_contextno sensitive capabilityget_project_identity_diagnosticno sensitive capabilityget_selected_pinsno sensitive capabilityget_setup_instructionsno sensitive capabilityget_time_to_fix_metricsno sensitive capabilityimplementno sensitive capabilityimplement_approved_pinsno sensitive capabilityinviteno sensitive capabilitylink_pin_deployno sensitive capabilitylist_collaboration_integrationsno sensitive capabilitylist_membersno sensitive capabilitymy-pinsno sensitive capabilitypage_urlno sensitive capabilitypin_idno sensitive capabilitypincushion-quickstartno sensitive capabilitypinsno sensitive capabilityproject_idno sensitive capabilityrecord_deployment_page_resultno sensitive capabilityrecord_pin_verificationno sensitive capabilityregister_deployment_discovered_pagesno sensitive capabilityremove_memberno sensitive capabilityreport_urlno sensitive capabilityresolveno sensitive capabilityresolve_annotationno sensitive capabilityresolve_quickstart_demono sensitive capabilitysearch_annotationsno sensitive capabilityset_slack_preferencesno sensitive capabilitysetupno sensitive capabilitystart_deployment_capture_runno sensitive capabilitystart_quickstart_demono sensitive capabilityupdate_critique_contextno sensitive capabilityupload_page_snapshotno sensitive capabilityurlsno sensitive capabilityusernameno sensitive capabilityVerificationno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (67 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.11.14 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.11.13 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.11.12 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v1.11.11 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.11.7 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.11.4 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.11.2 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v1.11.1 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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