Spec Workflow (pimzino) MCP Server

@pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp npm v2.2.5

Published by @pimzino — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
A
98/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 98/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade 100 − 2.1 = 98/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: Function("

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/git-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/core/git-utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/core/git-utils.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/dashboard/multi-server.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/multi-server.js:79`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/@pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp/latest'

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/dashboard/multi-server.js

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/dashboard/utils.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/utils.js:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/api/test`

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/dashboard/utils.js

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"@pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package @pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.2.5 latest A 98/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: A · 98/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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npx mcptrustchecker scan @pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp --online

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