Spec Workflow (pimzino) MCP Server
@pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp
npm
v2.2.5
Published by @pimzino — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for spec-driven development workflow with real-time web dashboard
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/git-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/git-utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { resolve } from 'path'; export const SPEC_WORKFLOW_SHARED_ROOT_ENV = 'SP
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/git-utils.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/dashboard/multi-server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/multi-server.js:79`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/@pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp/latest'); if (response.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/multi-server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/dashboard/utils.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/utils.js:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/api/test`, { method: 'GET', signal: AbortS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/utils.js
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: =="keyword"))try{return Function("","var x "+n.attrValue.replace(/,\s*$/,"").replace(/^!/,"")),n.inAttributeName=!0,n.at
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/public/assets/pug-DeIclll2.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { resolveGitRoot, resolveGitWorkspaceRoot, isGitWorktree, SPEC_WORKFLOW_S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/__tests__/git-utils.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/dashboard/public/assets/index-Dyq1VhYi.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/dashboard/public/assets/index-Dyq1VhYi.js:301`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }),!0),this.lastIndex=0}exec(Ve){this.matcherRe.lastIndex=this.lastIndex;const st=this.matcherRe.exec(Ve);if(!st)return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/public/assets/index-Dyq1VhYi.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.5 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Spec Workflow 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP server for managing spec workflow (requirements, design, implementation)
MCP server for spec-driven development workflow with real-time web dashboard (madmatt112 fork of Pimzino/spec-workflow-mcp)
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