Pilot MCP Server
pilot-mcp
npm
v0.4.2
Published by tacosyhorchata — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Fast browser automation MCP server for LLMs — persistent Chromium, ref-based interaction, cookie migration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (extension/content.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`extension/content.js:334`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: o-eval const result = eval(script); return { result: typeof result === 'object' ? JSON.stringify(result) : String(re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/content.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (extension/content.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`extension/content.js:334`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: o-eval const result = eval(script); return { result: typeof result === 'object' ? JSON.stringify(result) : String(re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/content.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/client.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; const SOCKET_PATH = path.join(os.tmpdir(),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cookie-import.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cookie-import.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; export class CookieImportError extends Error { code; action; constru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cookie-import.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os from 'os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"pilot-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package pilot-mcp
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pilot_annotated_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypilot_assertno sensitive capabilitypilot_authno sensitive capabilitypilot_backno sensitive capabilitypilot_blockno sensitive capabilitypilot_cdpno sensitive capabilitypilot_clickno sensitive capabilitypilot_clipboardno sensitive capabilitypilot_closeno sensitive capabilitypilot_consoleno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
pilot_cookiesno sensitive capabilitypilot_dialogno sensitive capabilitypilot_dragno sensitive capabilitypilot_element_stateno sensitive capabilitypilot_evaluateno sensitive capabilitypilot_extension_statusno sensitive capabilitypilot_file_uploadno sensitive capabilitypilot_fillno sensitive capabilitypilot_findno sensitive capabilitypilot_forwardno sensitive capabilitypilot_frame_resetno sensitive capabilitypilot_frame_selectno sensitive capabilitypilot_framesno sensitive capabilitypilot_geolocationno sensitive capabilitypilot_getno sensitive capabilitypilot_handle_dialogno sensitive capabilitypilot_handoffno sensitive capabilitypilot_hoverno sensitive capabilitypilot_import_cookiesno sensitive capabilitypilot_interceptno sensitive capabilitypilot_navigateno sensitive capabilitypilot_networkno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_attrsno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_cssno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_diffno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_formsno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_htmlno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_linksno sensitive capabilitypilot_page_textno sensitive capabilitypilot_pdfno sensitive capabilitypilot_perfno sensitive capabilitypilot_press_keyno sensitive capabilitypilot_reloadno sensitive capabilitypilot_resizeno sensitive capabilitypilot_responsiveno sensitive capabilitypilot_resumeno sensitive capabilitypilot_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypilot_scrollno sensitive capabilitypilot_select_optionno sensitive capabilitypilot_set_cookieno sensitive capabilitypilot_set_headerno sensitive capabilitypilot_set_useragentno sensitive capabilitypilot_snapshotno sensitive capabilitypilot_snapshot_diffno sensitive capabilitypilot_storageno sensitive capabilitypilot_tab_closeno sensitive capabilitypilot_tab_newno sensitive capabilitypilot_tab_selectno sensitive capabilitypilot_tabsno sensitive capabilitypilot_typeno sensitive capabilitypilot_waitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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