Video Metadata — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "@pickstar-2002/video-metadata-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@pickstar-2002/video-metadata-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@pickstar-2002/video-metadata-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/video-processor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/video-processor.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/video-processor.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/video-processor.js",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/video-processor.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/video-processor.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/video-processor.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/video-processor.ts",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"read_video_metadata\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_video_metadata\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_video_metadata",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"update_video_metadata\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"update_video_metadata\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_video_metadata",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"add_video_tags\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"add_video_tags\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "add_video_tags",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"remove_video_tags\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"remove_video_tags\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "remove_video_tags",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "read_video_metadata",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_video_metadata",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_video_tags",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "remove_video_tags",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_videos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_update_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_add_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_remove_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f49494d0733f740c6a101501b4f5def02fb46df7a2f9fcfbaace26c11a8d07b8",
"stats": {
"tools": 8,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}