Pi Mcp Adapter MCP Server
pi-mcp-adapter
npm
v2.32.1
Published by nicobailon — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) adapter extension for Pi coding agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir, platform } from "node:os"; import { extname, isAbsolute, join
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (glimpse-ui.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`glimpse-ui.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { join, dirname } from "node:path"; import { platform } from "node:os"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server glimpse-ui.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-auth.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-auth.ts:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { createHash } from 'crypto'; import { createRequire } from 'module'; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-auth.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (request-headers-command.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`request-headers-command.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import type { FetchLike } from "@model
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server request-headers-command.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (ui-session.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ui-session.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import net from "node:net"; import { U
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ui-session.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (utils.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`utils.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir, platform } from "node:os"; import { extname, isAbsolute, join
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (glimpse-ui.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`glimpse-ui.ts:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const glimpse = await import(modulePath); let active = true; const win = glimpse.open(html, { width: options.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server glimpse-ui.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.32.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.31.0 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v2.29.0 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v2.27.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.26.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.26.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.25.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.23.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.21.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.21.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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