Phonepi MCP Server
phonepi-mcp
npm
v1.0.29
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
PhonePi MCP - CLI tool for phone control via WebSocket
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-manager.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as net from 'ne
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/server-manager.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/server-manager.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s, StdioOptions } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as net from 'ne
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server-manager.ts
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
send_messagenetwork egresssend_notificationnetwork egresssend_smsnetwork egressshare_snippetnetwork egressadd_contactno sensitive capabilityadd_snippetno sensitive capabilitycancel_alarm_or_timerno sensitive capabilitycopy_to_clipboardno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_snippetno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
find_phoneno sensitive capabilityget_all_snippetsno sensitive capabilityget_battery_levelno sensitive capabilityget_contact_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_contactsno sensitive capabilityget_locationno sensitive capabilityget_message_responseno sensitive capabilityget_snippet_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_snippets_by_typeno sensitive capabilitymake_callno sensitive capabilitysearch_snippetsno sensitive capabilityset_alarmno sensitive capabilityset_timerno sensitive capabilitystop_alarmno sensitive capabilitytake_photono sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_snippetno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.29 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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