Phantom Audio MCP Server
phantom-audio
PyPI
v1.6.0
Published by fadelabs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI audio engineering system -- makes Claude a professional audio engineer
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/phantom/cli/setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/cli/setup.py:102`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nything. proc = subprocess.run( ["claude", "plugin", "marketplace", "add", _MARKETPLACE_URL],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/cli/setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/phantom/cli/setup_ableton.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/cli/setup_ableton.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180, env=env, check
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/cli/setup_ableton.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/phantom/cli/setup_reaper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/cli/setup_reaper.py:175`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: re.""" try: subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout) except FileNotFoundErr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/cli/setup_reaper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/phantom/cli/uninstall.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/cli/uninstall.py:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["uv", "tool", "uninstall", "phantom-audio"], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/cli/uninstall.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/phantom/cli/update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/cli/update.py:304`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["uv", "tool", "upgrade", UV_INSTALL_PACKAGE], capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/cli/update.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/phantom/_diagnostics.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/phantom/_diagnostics.py:37`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: mod = __import__(name) version = getattr(mod, "__version__", getattr(mod, "VERSION", "?"))
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/phantom/_diagnostics.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v1.5.2 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.5.1 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v1.3.1 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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