Perplexity Web Mcp Cli MCP Server
perplexity-web-mcp-cli
PyPI
v0.14.4
Published by jacob-bd — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/hack.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/hack.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] server_process = subprocess.Popen( server_cmd, env=server_env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/hack.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/setup.py:205`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [claude_cmd, "mcp", "add", "-s", "user", MCP_SERVER_KEY, "--", MCP_S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/perplexity_web_mcp/cli/setup.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pplx_get_threadingests untrusted inputpplx_list_threadsingests untrusted inputpplx_askno sensitive capabilitypplx_auth_completeno sensitive capabilitypplx_auth_request_codeno sensitive capabilitypplx_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitypplx_claude_opusno sensitive capabilitypplx_claude_opus_thinkno sensitive capabilitypplx_claude_sonnetno sensitive capabilitypplx_claude_sonnet_thinkno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
pplx_connectorsno sensitive capabilitypplx_councilno sensitive capabilitypplx_deep_researchno sensitive capabilitypplx_deep_research_startno sensitive capabilitypplx_gemini_pro_thinkno sensitive capabilitypplx_glm52no sensitive capabilitypplx_gpt56_solno sensitive capabilitypplx_gpt56_sol_thinkingno sensitive capabilitypplx_gpt56_terrano sensitive capabilitypplx_gpt56_terra_thinkingno sensitive capabilitypplx_grok45no sensitive capabilitypplx_grok45_thinkingno sensitive capabilitypplx_kimi_k26no sensitive capabilitypplx_kimi_k26_thinkingno sensitive capabilitypplx_nemotron_thinkingno sensitive capabilitypplx_queryno sensitive capabilitypplx_research_statusno sensitive capabilitypplx_smart_queryno sensitive capabilitypplx_sonarno sensitive capabilitypplx_usageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.14.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.14.3 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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