Perplexity User MCP Server
perplexity-user-mcp
npm
v0.8.60
Source verified
Published by automations-project — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Perplexity AI MCP server — browser automation for search, reasoning, research, and compute. Not affiliated with Perplexity AI, Inc.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/browser.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/browser.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; var CATEGORY = "browser"; function probeVersion(path) { if (process.platform =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/browser.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/runtime.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/runtime.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { join } from "path"; var CATEGORY = "runtime"; function parseMajor(v) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/runtime.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-5TA4ZES5.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-5TA4ZES5.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-5TA4ZES5.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-6YMQVLFX.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-6YMQVLFX.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; import { execFile as execFileCallbac
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-6YMQVLFX.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-CZQ66FPU.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-CZQ66FPU.mjs:248`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e as execFileCb } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { setTimeout as delay } from "timers/pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-CZQ66FPU.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-O563PYNB.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-O563PYNB.mjs:1162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { dirname as dirname2, join as join3 } from "path"; function getConsentCa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-O563PYNB.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-UECJTHPA.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-UECJTHPA.mjs:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n as nodeSpawn2 } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; import { execFile as execFileCallbac
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-UECJTHPA.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-Y4N53RRA.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-Y4N53RRA.mjs:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "crypto"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-Y4N53RRA.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xecFileCallback } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/native-deps-2FIYMX2L.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/native-deps-2FIYMX2L.mjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { join } from "path"; var STATE_MARKER = "native-deps-state.json"; functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/native-deps-2FIYMX2L.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.60 latest |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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