People Context — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "people-context",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "people-context"
},
"server": {
"name": "people-context"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/adapters/mcp/test_http_e2e.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/adapters/mcp/test_http_e2e.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/adapters/mcp/test_http_e2e.py"
},
"evidence": "ck_port() process = subprocess.Popen( [ uv, \"run\", \"people-context-mcp\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/adapters/mcp/test_http_e2e.py",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/adapters/mcp/test_stdio_e2e.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/adapters/mcp/test_stdio_e2e.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/adapters/mcp/test_stdio_e2e.py"
},
"evidence": "n updates\" shown = subprocess.run( [uv, \"run\", \"people-context\", \"--db\", str(db_path), \"show\", person_id],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/adapters/mcp/test_stdio_e2e.py",
"line": 64,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_demo_packaging.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_demo_packaging.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_demo_packaging.py"
},
"evidence": "h / \"wheel\" built = subprocess.run( [uv, \"build\", \"--wheel\", \"--out-dir\", str(wheel_dir)], cwd=proje",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_demo_packaging.py",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"people-context\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "people-context"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_relationship_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_communication_guidance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_communication_philosophy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stage_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "commit_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_people",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_person",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_person_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sensitive_person_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_people",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember_person",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_alias",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_affiliation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_fact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_observation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_trait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_interaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "correct_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_reminders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f6b01386acdb74387c2e271a0fd90a8c58d0c232d28b8d9000ebad66fde59df3",
"stats": {
"tools": 28,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 1
}
}
}