Pendpost MCP Server
pendpost
npm
v2.3.0
Published by pendpost — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
pendpost is a free, open-source (MIT), local-first social media planner where an AI agent drafts and schedules posts across Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, X, Telegram, Discord, Mastodon, Nostr, WordPress, and Ghost behind a human approval gate yo
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/pendpost.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/pendpost.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/pendpost.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/agent-runner.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/agent-runner.mjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/agent-runner.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/api.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/api.mjs:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ile, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; import os from 'node:os'; import { loadPlanStore,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/api.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/assets.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/assets.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { resolveBin } from './util.mjs';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/assets.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/cli-client.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/cli-client.mjs:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { createInterface } from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/cli-client.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/covers.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/covers.mjs:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { errorBody, resolveBin } from './
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/covers.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/notify.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/notify.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { loadPlanStore } from './plans.mjs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/notify.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/radar.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/radar.mjs:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { REPO_ROOT, readEnv } from './util.mjs'; import { activeRoot } from './c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/radar.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/scheduler.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/scheduler.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { REPO_ROOT, logLine } from './util.mjs'; import { activeRoot, withClient
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/scheduler.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/verify.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/verify.mjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { REPO_ROOT, errorBody } from './util.mjs'; import { activeRoot } from '.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/verify.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/linkedin-social.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/linkedin-social.mjs:1098`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch('https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo', { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } })
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/linkedin-social.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/reddit-social.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/reddit-social.mjs:132`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (); const res = await fetch('https://www.reddit.com/api/v1/access_token', { method: 'POST', headers: { A
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/reddit-social.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/yt-social.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/yt-social.mjs:359`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } const res = await fetch(`https://www.googleapis.com/upload/youtube/v3/thumbnails/set?videoId=${encodeURIComponent(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/yt-social.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v2.1.0 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v2.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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