@peleke.s/comfyui-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Source verified
Published by peleke — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
40-tool MCP server for ComfyUI: image generation, ControlNet, IP-Adapter, inpainting, TTS voice cloning, lip-sync video, and AnimateDiff — with smart prompt optimization across 6 model families (Flux, SDXL, SD1.5, Illustrious, Pony, Realistic).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/viewer.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import * as fs from "fs/promises"; import * as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/viewer.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_create_portraitsno sensitive capabilitycheck_connectionno sensitive capabilitycraft_promptno sensitive capabilitycreate_maskno sensitive capabilitycreate_portraitno sensitive capabilityexecute_pipelineno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_compositionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_controlnetno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_hidden_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_ipadapterno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_multi_controlnetno sensitive capabilitygenerate_with_poseno sensitive capabilityget_prompting_guideno sensitive capabilityget_queue_statusno sensitive capabilityimage_to_videono sensitive capabilityimagineno sensitive capabilityimg2imgno sensitive capabilityinpaintno sensitive capabilitylipsync_generateno sensitive capabilitylist_animatediff_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_avatarsno sensitive capabilitylist_controlnet_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_lipsync_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_lorasno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_prompting_strategiesno sensitive capabilitylist_samplersno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulersno sensitive capabilitylist_tts_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_upscale_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_voicesno sensitive capabilitylist_voices_catalogno sensitive capabilityoutpaintno sensitive capabilityping_comfyuino sensitive capabilitypreprocess_control_imageno sensitive capabilitystylize_photono sensitive capabilitytalkno sensitive capabilitytts_generateno sensitive capabilityupscale_imageno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @peleke.s/comfyui-mcp --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
Security scan results for the Comfyui (ModdingFox) MCP server.
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