Peekdev MCP Server
@peekdev/mcp
npm
v0.1.0-alpha.24
Source verified
Published by cubenest — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
local-first browser-session forensics + repro for AI coding agents. peek's native messaging host + stdio MCP server — owns ~/.peek/sessions.db (better-sqlite3) and bridges the browser extension, CLI, and AI tools to one local source of truth.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/native-host/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/native-host/installer.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/native-host/installer.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@peekdev/mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node ./scripts/postinstall-guard.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @peekdev/mcp
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_actioningests untrusted inputget_element_detailingests untrusted inputget_page_viewingests untrusted inputclear_highlightno sensitive capabilitygenerate_playwright_reprono sensitive capabilityget_dom_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_session_console_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_session_network_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_session_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_user_action_before_errorno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
list_recent_sessionsno sensitive capabilityquery_dom_historyno sensitive capabilityrequest_authorizationno sensitive capabilityrequest_pairingno sensitive capabilityrequest_user_inputno sensitive capabilitysearch_sessionsno sensitive capabilityset_intentno sensitive capabilitysuggest_elementno sensitive capabilityverify_audit_logno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0-alpha.24 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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