Pbi Webview2 MCP Server
pbi-webview2
npm
v1.2.0
Published by bibiibjorn — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that drives the LIVE Power BI Desktop report canvas (WebView2) over CDP — switch pages, click slicers, fire bookmarks, read cards/matrices as data, judge cross-filters, run the Performance Analyzer, and screenshot, with no reload and no OCR.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "pbi_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "pbi_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool pbi_eval
high Tool "pbi_run_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "pbi_run_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool pbi_run_code
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/tools.js:1141`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = eval('(' + code + ')'); return typeof fn === 'function' ? fn() : fn; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/launch.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; const CDP_HOST = '127.0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/launch.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([pbi_drill]) co-exist with external-action tools ([pbi_eval, pbi_run_code]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [pbi_drill] → sinks [pbi_eval, pbi_run_code]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow pbi_drill → pbi_eval
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "pbi_run_code"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "pbi_run_code" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool pbi_run_code · inputSchema.properties.code
low Mutating tool "pbi_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "pbi_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool pbi_eval
low Mutating tool "pbi_run_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "pbi_run_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool pbi_run_code
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pbi_drillingests untrusted inputpbi_evalruns code / shellpbi_run_coderuns code / shellpbi_annotate_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypbi_assertno sensitive capabilitypbi_baselineno sensitive capabilitypbi_clickno sensitive capabilitypbi_closeno sensitive capabilitypbi_context_menuno sensitive capabilitypbi_cross_filter_testno sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
pbi_dax_batchno sensitive capabilitypbi_dax_queryno sensitive capabilitypbi_deep_snapshotno sensitive capabilitypbi_deselectno sensitive capabilitypbi_dialogno sensitive capabilitypbi_diff_stateno sensitive capabilitypbi_editor_bufferno sensitive capabilitypbi_emulate_themeno sensitive capabilitypbi_expand_allno sensitive capabilitypbi_fire_bookmarkno sensitive capabilitypbi_format_daxno sensitive capabilitypbi_goto_pageno sensitive capabilitypbi_healthno sensitive capabilitypbi_hover_tooltipno sensitive capabilitypbi_keyboard_navno sensitive capabilitypbi_launchno sensitive capabilitypbi_matrix_expandno sensitive capabilitypbi_model_infono sensitive capabilitypbi_multiselect_slicerno sensitive capabilitypbi_page_digestno sensitive capabilitypbi_page_sweepno sensitive capabilitypbi_pagesno sensitive capabilitypbi_perf_analyzerno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_cardsno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_dax_editorno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_filtersno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_matrixno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_slicerno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_tableno sensitive capabilitypbi_read_tmdlno sensitive capabilitypbi_reloadno sensitive capabilitypbi_saveno sensitive capabilitypbi_scan_errorsno sensitive capabilitypbi_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypbi_search_slicerno sensitive capabilitypbi_set_slicerno sensitive capabilitypbi_show_as_tableno sensitive capabilitypbi_snapshotno sensitive capabilitypbi_sort_columnno sensitive capabilitypbi_state_probeno sensitive capabilitypbi_statusno sensitive capabilitypbi_typeno sensitive capabilitypbi_visualsno sensitive capabilitypbi_wait_forno sensitive capabilitypbi_wait_stableno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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