Paybridge Np MCP Server

@paybridge-np/mcp npm v1.2.0

Published by @paybridge-np — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Official Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for PayBridgeNP — lets Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible AI assistant manage your PayBridgeNP account through natural language

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_payment, search_docs, get_refund, get_plan, get_customer, get_subscription, get_invoice, get_coupon, get_promotion_code, get_tax_settings, get_checkout_session, get_payment_link]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook_endpoint, update_webhook_endpoint, delete_webhook_endpoint, create_payment_link]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_payment, search_docs, get_refund, get_plan, get_customer, get_subscription, get_invoice, get_coupon, get_promotion_code, get_tax_settings, get_ch

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_payment → create_webhook_endpoint

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook_endpoint"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_webhook_endpoint" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_webhook_endpoint · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook_endpoint"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "update_webhook_endpoint" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool update_webhook_endpoint · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "redirect_url" on "create_payment_link"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_payment_link" takes a URL/host parameter "redirect_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_payment_link · inputSchema.properties.redirect_url

Tools 85

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_payment_linknetwork egress
  • create_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • delete_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • get_checkout_sessioningests untrusted input
  • get_couponingests untrusted input
  • get_customeringests untrusted input
  • get_invoiceingests untrusted input
  • get_paymentingests untrusted input
  • get_payment_linkingests untrusted input
  • get_planingests untrusted input
Show 75 more tools ↓
  • get_promotion_codeingests untrusted input
  • get_refundingests untrusted input
  • get_subscriptioningests untrusted input
  • get_tax_settingsingests untrusted input
  • search_docsingests untrusted input
  • update_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • add_customer_creditno sensitive capability
  • apply_coupon_to_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • apply_discountno sensitive capability
  • cancel_payment_linkno sensitive capability
  • cancel_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • change_subscription_planno sensitive capability
  • coupon_codeno sensitive capability
  • create_checkout_sessionno sensitive capability
  • create_couponno sensitive capability
  • create_customerno sensitive capability
  • create_dunning_policyno sensitive capability
  • create_invoice_itemno sensitive capability
  • create_planno sensitive capability
  • create_promotion_codeno sensitive capability
  • create_refundno sensitive capability
  • create_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • customer_emailno sensitive capability
  • daily_summaryno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_couponno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_promotion_codeno sensitive capability
  • delete_invoice_itemno sensitive capability
  • delete_payment_linkno sensitive capability
  • emailno sensitive capability
  • end_subscription_trialno sensitive capability
  • extend_subscription_trialno sensitive capability
  • get_accountno sensitive capability
  • get_analytics_overviewno sensitive capability
  • get_dunning_invoice_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_subscription_usage_summaryno sensitive capability
  • investigate_failed_paymentno sensitive capability
  • list_checkout_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • list_couponsno sensitive capability
  • list_customersno sensitive capability
  • list_dunning_policiesno sensitive capability
  • list_invoice_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_invoicesno sensitive capability
  • list_payment_linksno sensitive capability
  • list_paymentsno sensitive capability
  • list_plansno sensitive capability
  • list_promotion_codesno sensitive capability
  • list_refundsno sensitive capability
  • list_subscriptionsno sensitive capability
  • list_usage_recordsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_endpointsno sensitive capability
  • monthno sensitive capability
  • monthly_reconciliationno sensitive capability
  • nameno sensitive capability
  • onboard_customerno sensitive capability
  • pause_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • payment_idno sensitive capability
  • plan_idno sensitive capability
  • preview_subscription_prorationno sensitive capability
  • promotion_codeno sensitive capability
  • remove_subscription_discountno sensitive capability
  • report_subscription_usageno sensitive capability
  • resume_subscriptionno sensitive capability
  • retry_invoice_dunning_nowno sensitive capability
  • review_dunningno sensitive capability
  • set_subscription_dunning_policyno sensitive capability
  • stop_invoice_dunningno sensitive capability
  • subscription_idno sensitive capability
  • update_customerno sensitive capability
  • update_dunning_policyno sensitive capability
  • update_payment_linkno sensitive capability
  • update_planno sensitive capability
  • update_subscription_quantityno sensitive capability
  • update_tax_settingsno sensitive capability
  • validate_promotion_codeno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.0 latest A 96/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-08
v1.1.0 A 96/100 4 1.13.0 2026-08-27

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MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @paybridge-np/mcp --online

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