Pathlight MCP Server
pathlight-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.7
Published by mikenahh92 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/harness/server.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`tests/harness/server.py:77`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dict(os.environ)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/harness/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pathlight_mcp/backends/linux.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pathlight_mcp/backends/linux.py:1686`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pathlight_mcp/backends/linux.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pathlight_mcp/cdp/browser_resolver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pathlight_mcp/cdp/browser_resolver.py:221`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pathlight_mcp/cdp/browser_resolver.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verify_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify_release.py:100`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verify_release.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/pathlight_mcp/tools/launch_app.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/pathlight_mcp/tools/launch_app.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pathlight_mcp/tools/launch_app.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/fixtures/capture_linux_snapshots.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/fixtures/capture_linux_snapshots.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/fixtures/capture_linux_snapshots.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/fixtures/capture_windows_snapshots.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/fixtures/capture_windows_snapshots.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/fixtures/capture_windows_snapshots.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
desktop.web_upload_filesnetwork egressdesktop.clickno sensitive capabilitydesktop.clipboard_readno sensitive capabilitydesktop.clipboard_writeno sensitive capabilitydesktop.findno sensitive capabilitydesktop.focus_windowno sensitive capabilitydesktop.get_table_infono sensitive capabilitydesktop.get_textno sensitive capabilitydesktop.get_tree_infono sensitive capabilitydesktop.launch_appno sensitive capabilitydesktop.list_windowsno sensitive capabilitydesktop.manage_windowno sensitive capabilitydesktop.multi_actionno sensitive capabilitydesktop.press_keyno sensitive capabilitydesktop.scroll_to_itemno sensitive capabilitydesktop.snapshotno sensitive capabilitydesktop.type_textno sensitive capabilitydesktop.wait_forno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_clickno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_connectno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_evaluateno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_frame_treeno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_hoverno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_list_tabsno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_navigateno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_screenshotno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_select_optionno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_tab_actionno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_typeno sensitive capabilitydesktop.web_wait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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